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ABSTRACT 
  This Article develops a theory of rhetoric in corporate law 
jurisprudence. It begins by examining a recent innovation in 
Delaware case law: the emerging principle of “good faith.” Good 
faith is an old notion in law generally, but it offers to bring significant 
change to corporate law, including realignment of the business 
judgment rule and a shift in the traditional balance between the 
authority of boards and the accountability of boards to courts. This 
Article argues, however, that good faith functions as a rhetorical 
device rather than a substantive standard. That is, it operates as a 
speech act, a performance, as opposed to a careful method of analysis. 
  To explain the sudden appearance of good faith, this Article 
articulates a model of corporate law rhetoric. Courts invent rhetorical 
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devices to loosen corporate law doctrine and increase judicial review 
of board decisionmaking in response to scandals and other extralegal 
pressures operating upon the judiciary. These pressures stem largely 
from the twin threats of corporate migration and federal preemption, 
both of which imperil the primacy of the Delaware judiciary as a 
corporate lawmaker. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary 
employs rhetorical devices to reduce these pressures, typically with the 
effect of increasing board accountability, only to return, once the 
pressure recedes, to a position of board deference. After finding 
several examples of this pattern in corporate law history, this Article 
argues, ultimately, that regular movement back and forth along the 
authority/accountability spectrum is an essential feature of corporate 
law jurisprudence and that understanding the rhetorical devices that 
permit this movement is necessary to complete any account of what 
corporate law is and how it works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a period of scandal and crisis in American corporate 
governance, corporate law has rediscovered good faith. 
Good faith is not a new idea. It has long been recognized as a 
background principle in several areas of law,1 and no corporate 
lawyer who was not guilty of malpractice has ever advised a board of 
directors that its members could safely behave in bad faith.2 In 
Delaware, the primary source of American corporate law,3 both the 
legislature and the courts have recognized some notion of good faith. 
Good faith is a prerequisite to a corporation’s ability, under  
§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, to absolve its 
directors for liabilities incurred in shareholder litigation.4 Moreover, 
the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged good faith in its 
corporate law opinions, occasionally ranking it alongside the 
traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty and thereby implying 
that good faith is to be given a role in fiduciary duty analysis equal to 
the other two.5 
                                                 
 1. See generally  Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, 
Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995) (describing good faith in 
various areas of law); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long -Term Open Quantity Contracts: 
Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2002) (tracing judicial development of good 
faith in commercial contracts). 
 2. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key 
Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652, 658–59 (1979) (“I don’t think it would ever have been 
possible to persuade Delaware courts that the Business Judgment Rule prevents a transaction 
from being enjoined or immunizes directors from personal liability if it is established that the 
directors did not act in good faith . . . .”). In fact, it is a common summation of a director’s 
corporate law obligations to state that she must exercise her fiduciary duties in good faith. See, 
e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 983–84 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (describing an allegation that “called into question the directors’ good faith exercise 
of their fiduciary duties”).  
 3. The number of major firms incorporating in Delaware and the willingness of other 
states to be guided by Delaware has established Delaware law as national corporate law. See 
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (“The aggregated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. 
corporations have resulted in a convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de 
facto national corporate law.”); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions 
Where to Incorporate,  46 J.L.  & ECON. 383, 389 (2003) (supplying statistics showing that 
Delaware is the state of incorporation for half of all public companies and 59 percent of the 
Fortune 500). 
 4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see discussion infra  Part I.A. 
 5. These cases refer to a “triad” of fiduciary duties, including care, loyalty, and good faith. 
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware 
corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”); 
McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he shareholder plaintiff must effectively 
provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision, 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
4 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1 
The function of good faith in corporate law, however, is not 
perfectly clear. For all of the judicial and legislative references to it, 
the principle is defined neither in the Delaware statute nor in judicial 
precedent.6 And although everyone understands it, in some general 
sense, good faith is a difficult concept to operationalize in law.7 The 
Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that good faith is an 
amorphous principle, the meaning of which “varies somewhat with 
the context.”8 In the context of corporate law, it is difficult to give 
                                                                                                                
breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or due care.” (internal 
quotation omitted)); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“The director’s fiduciary 
duty to both the corporation and its shareholders has been characterized by this Court as a triad: 
due care, good faith, and loyalty.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 
1993) (“To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that 
directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary 
duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”). 
 6. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to 
Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging 
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 
119 (2004) (“Unfortunately  . . . ‘good faith’ is not defined anywhere in the [Delaware General 
Corporation Law]. Nor does the framing of § 102(b)(7) provide any helpful insight.”). The 
Delaware Supreme Court opinions listing good faith alongside care and loyalty in the “triad” of 
fiduciary duties neither define good faith nor rely upon it to reach the outcome of the case. See 
supra note 5 and accompanying text. Moreover, the separate status of good faith may be the 
result of a longstanding confusion between the categories of fiduciary duty and the means by 
which a plaintiff can rebut the business judgment rule. The string of citations in note 5, supra, all 
trace ultimately to Aronson v. Lewis, where a breach of good faith is listed alongside violations 
of care and loyalty as situations to which the business judgment rule will not apply , not as a 
separate and equal mode for analyzing fiduciary duty . 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). It is well 
understood that there are a handful of situations to which the business judgment rule does not 
apply, such as waste and illegality. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business 
Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 
1355, 1369 (1993) (“[T]he absence of waste, egregious conduct, illegality, fraud, and ultra vires 
conduct also is necessary for [the business judgment rule’s] application.”). These, however, are 
treated as sui generis circumstances, not as separate modes of fiduciary duty analysis. Judicial 
recitations of good faith as a separate fiduciary duty are thus the result of a quotation taken out 
of context. 
 7. A general sense of good faith may involve consistency between word and deed. See, 
e.g., PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
COMMENTARY NO. 10 (§ 1-203) (final draft Feb. 10, 1994) (defining good faith as “honesty in 
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned” but ultimately concluding that good faith alone 
“does not support a cause of action where no other basis for a cause of action exists”); see also 
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 369, 378–85 (1980) (arg uing that good faith limits a party’s discretion in 
performance to actions taken for reasons allowed by the original contract); David Rosenberg, 
Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512 (2004) (arguing that good faith in corporate law should be 
interpreted in the same way as it is in the law of contracts). 
 8. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443 (Del. 1996) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a. (1979)). The court pursued the 
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good faith any content that does not merely restate either the duty of 
care or the duty of loyalty.9 If one thinks of good faith as doing the 
job right or adequately fulfilling one’s fiduciary obligations, then it 
drifts towards the sort of prudential issues ordinarily addressed under 
the duty of care.10 Likewise, if one thinks of good faith as acting 
selflessly in the corporation’s interest, then it slides towards issues 
typically analyzed under the duty of loyalty.11 In his attempt to pin 
down its meaning, then-Chancellor Allen suggested that good faith 
                                                                                                                
Restatement quotation, adding “[g]ood faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party.” Id. Tellingly, the court went on to suggest that good faith has 
no content of its own, except in relation to an alleged misdeed: 
[Good faith is] a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves 
to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a particular context 
the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with 
the specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically excluded. 
Id. at 443 (quoting Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 9. On the traditional division of corporate fiduciary obligations into the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty, see infra  Part I.A. 
 10. Defining good faith as adequately fulfilling one’s obligations, obviously, is question 
begging. To understand it, one must ask what one’s obligations are and then ask whether those 
obligations have been adequately fulfilled. Each of these inquiries, however, is highly 
problematic. The first reveals the definition as circular, defining a fiduciary obligation (good 
faith) in terms of the fulfillment of fiduciary obligations, while the second question is squarely 
under the duty of care and therefore cannot be asked without disturbing the business judgment 
rule. On the relationship of good faith to the business judgment rule, see infra  Part I.A. 
 11. Several closely reasoned chancery court opinions treat good faith as an aspect of the 
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[T]he duty to 
act in ‘good faith’ is merely a subset of a director’s duty of loyalty.”); In re Gaylord Container 
Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (arguing that good faith, correctly 
understood, is a component of the duty of loyalty). Moreover, justices of the Delaware Supreme 
Court have occasionally viewed good faith as a mere aspect of the duty of loyalty. Justice 
Jacobs, for example, when still a vice chancellor, wrote in his opinion in Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin that “doctrinally [the] obligation [to act in good faith] does not exist separate and apart 
from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.” Civ. Action No. 9700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *86 n.63 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001). A few years later, having been appointed to the Supreme Court, but 
sitting by designation at the chancery court, Jacobs retreated from these statements, stating that 
the defendant may have breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty “and/or” good faith and noting 
“[t]he Court employs the ‘and/or’ phraseology because the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to 
articulate the precise differentiation between the duties of loyalty and of good faith.” In re 
Emerging Comm’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. Civ. Action No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
70, at *142 n.184 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). Similarly, it was Chancellor Chandler, who confidently 
announced in Orman that good faith was merely an aspect of the duty of loyalty, Orman, 794 
A.2d at 14 n.3, who then allowed the plaintiffs in Disney to survive dismissal on the basis of 
good faith when the question of loyalty was not properly before the court, In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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may simply be a shorthand reference to the welfare-maximization 
goals underlying corporate law.12 
But the role of good faith in corporate law jurisprudence is 
changing. An emerging line of cases rejects a vision of good faith as 
mere shorthand for the duties of care and loyalty and establishes it, 
instead, as an independent basis for decision. By sustaining causes of 
action under the principle of good faith when neither traditional 
mode of fiduciary duty analysis is available, these cases carve a 
separate doctrinal role for good faith with distinct adjudicative power, 
opening board governance decisions to a greater degree of judicial 
scrutiny. This is not a small change. It frees courts from the confines 
of care and loyalty in reviewing governance decisions and promises to 
shift the fulcrum on the scale balancing the authority of boards and 
their accountability to courts.13 Given the hitherto amorphous 
character of good faith, this new doctrinal role raises several urgent 
questions. Most basically , what will good faith come to mean in 
corporate law? Will it create a new cause of action for shareholder 
plaintiffs? Will it rewrite the business judgment rule, leading to 
greater judicial intervention in corporate governance and a lasting 
shift in the authority/accountability balance? 
This Article aims to answer those questions. In it, I argue that the 
emerging duty of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device 
rather than as a substantive standard. Good faith, in other words, is 
not now and is not likely ever to develop into a distinct doctrine of 
subrules and multipart tests. Instead, the pattern in the good faith 
cases is to raise issues under both the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty but, rather than following either traditional analysis through 
to a conclusion, to blend the issues together and, in doing so, identify 
a basis for liability under the duty of good faith. This mode of 
analysis, involving the oscillation between two distinct doctrinal 
categories, I will call “thaumatrope analytics.” The term refers to an 
optical toy involving a disk with a different image on each side—a 
horse and a man, for example, or a bird and a cage—and a string 
                                                 
 12. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“By 
‘bad faith’ is meant a transaction that is authorized for some purpose other than a genuine 
attempt to advance corporate welfare . . . .”). 
 13. Throughout this Article, I will use the terms (board) authority and (judicial) 
accountability to refer to the balance between the authority of boards, on the one  hand, and  
the accountability of boards to courts, on the other. By “judicial accountability,” I mean  
the accountability of boards to the judiciary and not, as the phrase is sometimes used, the 
accountability of the judiciary to some other authority. 
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attached at either edge of the disk enabling the device to spin.14 When 
the viewer spins the thaumatrope, the images on either side of the 
disk seem to blend together to produce a third image that is a 
composite of the other two—the man atop the horse or the bird in the 
cage. Good faith, I argue, is simply the application of the 
thaumatrope to the duties of care and loyalty. Spinning the two 
together, the composite image—of a poor decisionmaking process 
mixed with hints of conflicting interest—may trigger liability under 
something the judiciary now calls “good faith.” 
By distinguishing rhetoric from substance, I do not mean to 
denigrate the significance of either good faith or rhetoric, but rather 
to emphasize good faith as a speech act, a performance, as opposed to 
a carefully delineated mode of analysis.15 My account of good faith as 
a rhetorical device stresses, first and foremost, its contextual 
contingency. The duty of good faith emerged in an environment of 
sturm und drang in corporate governance, when a series of scandals—
including frauds and failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and 
Adelphia, celebrity insider trading, and corruption in the IPO 
market—drew American corporate governance into question and 
                                                 
 14. The thaumatrope was popularized by John Aytron Paris in the 1820s. The name is 
derived from the Greek “thauma,” wondrous or marvelous, and “trope,” something that turns 
or spins. The term was brought into the legal literature by Leon Lipson to criticize Cardozo’s 
analysis in the Allegheny College opinion. Leon S. Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 
YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977). 
 15. I take this understanding of rhetoric from the law-and-literature movement. See JAMES 
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW 28 (1984) (defining rhetoric as “the central art by which culture 
and community are established, maintained, and transformed”); Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric 
of the Judicial Opinion, in LAW’S STORIES, 187, 187 (Brooks & Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“Judicial 
opinions are rhetorical performances. The critic who essays an assessment of any performance, 
whether dramatic or judicial, must be aware, among other things, of the particular role assigned 
to the actor, the likely audience for the performance, and the effects sought by the performer.”). 
Professor White further describes how to read a work for its rhetorical meaning: 
The basic question we shall ask of the texts we read, and of the pa rticular 
performances within them, will thus be What kind of action with words is this? This 
question will be elaborated by being broken down into two others: What kind of 
relationship does this writer establish with his language? and What kind of 
relationship does he establish with his audience or reader? To put this in other words: 
What kind of cultural action is this writing? and What kind of social action is it? 
JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 6 (1984). The rhetorical meaning 
of a text is not necessarily distinct from its analytical meaning, and I seek to distinguish the two 
only to emphasize the rhetorical aspect of good faith in arguing, ultimately, that strategic 
considerations dominate the analytic content of the new doctrine. This distinguishes my account 
of good faith from those seeking to locate a substantive principle of law in the emerging line of 
jurisprudence. See infra Part I.C. For a similar treatment of “good faith” in contract law, see 
generally Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty 
Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1. 
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plunged previously settled questions into heated debate. Post-Enron, 
the responsiveness (or laxity) of the states, Delaware in particular, in 
matters of corporate governance was hotly contested. The good faith 
thaumatrope is a response, in rhetoric, to this environment of crisis 
and debate. 
In probing the nature of this response, this Article argues that 
the purpose and effect of such rhetoric is to loosen the doctrinal 
constraints on the Delaware judiciary and to enable its judges to shift 
the authority/accountability balance in response to a change in the set 
of pressures and constraints then operating upon them. These 
pressures stem largely from the twin threats of corporate migration 
and federal preemption, both of which imperil the primacy of the 
Delaware judiciary as a corporate lawmaker, but each of which varies 
in strength depending upon the extralegal environment of scandal or 
calm. This forms the basis of my theory of rhetoric in corporate law 
jurisprudence. In periods of crisis and scandal, the judiciary employs 
rhetorical devices to increase the accountability of boards, making the 
judiciary appear responsive and thus alleviating the pressures acting 
on it. Once the pressure recedes, however, the judiciary returns to a 
position of board deference.16 An implication of this theory is that in 
predicting corporate law outcomes, the world outside the 
courtroom—specifically, the context of crisis or calm and the relative 
threat of migration or preemption—is at least as important as, and 
perhaps more important than, the doctrine itself. Another 
implication, applying this theory of corporate law rhetoric to the 
emerging jurisprudence of good faith, is that the breadth of judicial 
scrutiny promised by the new doctrine will eventually narrow as the 
crisis that spurred its creation recedes. 
                                                 
 16. In this I am neither criticizing nor celebrating the judiciary for invading the domain of 
board authority, nor am I pressing a normative claim about the optimal balance of board 
authority and judicial accountability in corporate governance. These issues have been debated 
by numerous eminent scholars, arguing on the one hand that greater accountability is necessary 
to reign in board excesses and, on the other, that greater accountability imposes substantial 
costs on all companies for a highly questionable deterrence effect on a (possibly small) subset of 
wrongdoers. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (advancing a model of corporate 
governance based on board authority), with Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sa rbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Reinvention of Corporate Governance, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 n.2 (2003) (calling for 
greater regulation of corporate governance on the basis that “the laxity of Delaware law. . . with 
[its] shameful and disingenuous opinions . . . can no longer be in dispute”). Because the ultimate 
resolution of this debate depends on empirical evidence that currently does not exist, rather 
than offering a normative account of how Delaware law should work, I am offering, instead, a 
descriptive account of how Delaware law does work. 
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This Article’s prediction that good faith will not become a fixed 
doctrine of corporate law should not be taken as an argument that the 
emerging jurisprudence of good faith is unimportant. Good faith may, 
after all, return with the next set of corporate governance scandals. 
But, even if it does not, the jurisprudence of good faith represents a 
paradigmatic example of corporate law rhetoric, illustrating its ability 
to shift and, once the undercurrents acting upon the judiciary have 
changed, to shift back. This pattern recurs so often and is so 
fundamental to the structure of corporate law jurisprudence that no 
understanding of corporate law can be complete without it. The 
central contribution of this Article is its elucidation of the underlying 
rhetorical structure of corporate law through a close examination of 
the jurisprudence of good faith. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I situates good faith in 
existing corporate law doctrine, describing in particular its 
relationship with the business judgment rule and statutory law, then 
tracing the emergence of good faith jurisprudence through a line of 
Delaware cases and evaluating attempts to import some substantive 
content into the meaning of good faith. Next, Part II argues that the 
duty of good faith is best understood as a rhetorical device and shows 
how the device seems to operate—that is, by oscillating between 
concerns typically raised under the duties of care and loyalty. Part II 
also emphasizes the contextual contingency of good faith analyses, 
situating the emergence of good faith in the recent environment of 
corporate scandal. Part III then engages the question of the future of 
good faith in corporate law, describing the system of constraints 
operating upon the Delaware judiciary, and ultimately arguing that 
the jurisprudence of good faith is both bounded by the constraints 
operating upon the judiciary and a means of manipulating those 
bounds. 
I.  GOOD FAITH IN CORPORATE LAW 
A. The Background of Business Judgment 
Fiduciary duty analyses traditionally focus on the duties of 
loyalty and care.17 The duty of loyalty, in its simplest formulation, is a 
                                                 
 17. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and 
duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of 
a corporation and its stockholders. Each of these duties is of equal and independent 
significance.” (citation omitted)); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate 
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proscription against director conflict of interest and self-dealing.18 
Meanwhile, the duty of care, stated on its own terms,19 requires simply 
that directors in control of the corporate enterprise exercise the same 
level of care that would be expected of ordinarily prudent persons in 
the conduct of their own affairs.20 In theory, at least, each of these 
fiduciary duties is an available basis for shareholder causes of action 
seeking to challenge board decisionmaking. In practice, however, the 
business judgment rule operates as a significant barrier to claims 
                                                                                                                
Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 599 n.9 (1997) (“Legal conventions divide fiduciary obligations into 
obligations of loyalty and obligations of care.”). 
 18. A comprehensive statement of duty-of-loyalty principles appears in Guth v. Loft, Inc.: 
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand 
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, 
existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human 
characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer 
or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, 
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his 
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might 
properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its 
powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation 
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest. 
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added); cf. Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering 
Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 29–30 (2003) (developing a 
broader account of loyalty that distinguishes a “non-betrayal” aspect from a “devotion” aspect). 
 19. That is, without application of the business judgment rule. See infra notes 20–21. 
 20. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) (requiring that directors act as would 
“ordinarily prudent and diligent men . . . under similar circumstances”); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, 
Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he duty of care refers to the responsibility of a 
corporate fiduciary to exercise  . . . the care that a reasonably prudent person in a similar 
position would use under similar circumstances.”); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 
A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are 
bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances.”). Application of the business judgment rule changes the liability standard under 
the duty of care from negligence—that is, reasonableness or ordinary prudence—to gross 
negligence. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“While the Delaware cases use a 
variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under 
the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.” 
(footnote omitted)). A shift in the standard of liability does not ne cessarily  imply a shift in the 
standard of care. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: 
A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1311 
(2001) (emphasizing that the business judgment rule is a standard of judicial review, distinct 
from the standards of conduct that directors are expected to uphold); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 437, 443 (1993) (distinguishing the duty of care, as standards of conduct, from the 
business judgment rule, as a standard of review). However, a reduction in probable liability for 
carelessness may have an impact on director incentives to take care, thereby resulting in a de 
facto shift in the standard of care. 
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under the duty of care.21 If the shareholder plaintiff cannot plead facts 
sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule’s substantive 
standards,22 the rule will apply, with the typical effect that the board 
wins, the shareholder loses, and the court stays out of it.23 
This analytical structure creates a significant obstacle to court 
intervention in corporate governance decisions which, in the absence 
of director conflict of interest, raise issues only under the duty of care 
and are subsequently protected from judicial intervention by the 
business judgment rule.24 The business judgment rule, in other words, 
                                                 
 21. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986): 
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged 
or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for 
the consequences of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that 
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply. 
Id. The business judgment rule operates both as an evidentiary presumption and as a 
substantive standard. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Although the business judgment rule 
applies equally to each fiduciary duty as an evide ntiary presumption, as a substantive standard 
the rule applies differently depending upon which of the directors’ fiduciary duties is under 
review. See CLARK, supra, at 124 n.7 (“The ‘gross negligence’ formulation is concerned only 
with adjusting the business judgment rule to the fiduciary duty of care; the duty of loyalty . . . is 
another matter.”). A plaintiff challenging the board’s actions under the duty of care must allege 
facts that show that the board’s conduct rises (or falls) to the level of “gross negligence.” See 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (“We think the concept of gross 
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by 
a board of directors was an informed one.”); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. By contrast, a plaintiff 
challenging the board’s actions under the duty of loyalty does not bear the burden of 
establishing a gross conflict of interest. Any  material conflict of interest on the part of the board 
will rebut the business judgment rule and require the board to establish that the challenged 
decision or transaction was either approved by disinterested directors, ratified by shareholders, 
or fair to the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2003) (providing that conflict of 
interests transactions are not void or voidable if they are either approved, ratified, or fair); 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (establishing the  standard of entire 
fairness: “[w]hen directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are 
required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of 
the bargain”). 
 22. These claims are evaluated at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 
794 A.2d 5, 15 (Del. Ch. 2002) (emphasizing that the plaintiff’s claim must be must be supported 
by facts and not mere conclusory assertions). The principle sources of facts available to plaintiffs 
at this prediscovery stage in the litigation are media accounts, public filings, and board minutes. 
Id. at 16 n.9. 
 23. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (“If a shareholder plaintiff 
fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule operates to provide substantive 
protection for the directors and for the decisions that they have made.”).  
 24. Director accountability under state law for corporate governance decisions is a matter 
of theory  as opposed to reality . See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051–52 
(Del. Ch. 1996), in which Chancellor Allen noted: 
There is a theoretical exception to [the business judgment rule] that holds that some 
decisions may be so ‘egregious’ that liability . . . may follow even in the absence of 
proof of conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception, however, has 
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establishes corporate law’s balance between board authority and 
judicial accountability.25 It protects the authority of the board to 
govern the corporation without having to account to courts for their 
decisions. Delaware’s basic policy choice is a robust interpretation of 
the business judgment rule and respect for the principle of 
nonintervention in corporate governance.26 The business judgment 
rule, however, is a moving frontier. Judges decide themselves when 
and how it will constrain them,27 and the Delaware judiciary has 
recently used the principle of good faith to loosen its constraints. 
                                                                                                                
resulted in no awards of money judgments against corporate officers or directors in 
[Delaware] . . . . Thus, to allege that a corporation has suffered a loss . . . does not 
state a claim for relief against that fiduciary no ma tter how foolish the investment . . . . 
Id. at 1052; see also Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 242 (noting 
that although agency costs may be understood as the sum of managerial selfishness and 
managerial foolishness, legal liability attaches only to selfishness since “[t]he liability standard 
that corporate law applies to managerial decisions is, realistically, no liability at all for mistakes, 
absent fraud or conflict of interest”). Roe further states: 
Conventional corporate law does little, or nothing, to directly reduce shirking, 
mistakes, and bad business decisions that squander shareholder value. The business 
judgment rule is, absent fraud or conflict of interest, nearly insurmountable in 
America, insulating directors and managers from judges and freeing them from legal 
scrutiny. 
Id. at 243. 
 25. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 103 (2004) (describing the tradeoff between authority and accountability as a 
central concern of corporate governance and noting that “[t]he difficulty is that authority and 
accountability are ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less 
of the other”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1699 (2001) (describing 
the business judgment rule as a “jurisdictional boundary” protecting the governance principle of 
authority within the firm and concluding that “[w]ithout respect for the boundary, centralized 
management could not operate as it does”). 
 26. The principle of nonintervention is apparent in the care taken by members of the 
Delaware judiciary to avoid becoming “super-directors.” See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“To rule otherwise would invite courts to become super-directors, 
measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and executive compensation.”); In re 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *14 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
31, 1989) (“To recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance of business decisions 
for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where those decisions are made by truly 
disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of courts super-
directors.”). 
 27. The question of how much to intervene in corporate decisionma king has been 
described by Chief Justice Veasey as corporate law’s “defining tension” and by Chancellor 
Allen as “the tension that occupies its core.” See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation 
Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 894–95 (1997) (referring to “the tension between the ways in 
which long -term wealth may be maximized through broad managerial discretion and the ways 
long-term wealth maximization may be thought to require protections that entail limitation on 
the power of management”); E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate 
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Delaware law has at least two doctrinal hooks from which to 
hang a jurisprudence of good faith. First, good faith appears as a 
statutory limitation on the ability of a corporation to exculpate its 
directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Second, good faith is often 
recited as an aspect of the business judgment rule. In spite of these 
doctrinal bases, neither the functional meaning of good faith nor its 
potential relationship to other corporate law doctrines has ever been 
specified. 
The statutory basis of good faith is Section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, which permits corporations, 
through the adoption of a charter term—a so-called “102(b)(7) 
provision”—to exculpate directors for violations of fiduciary duty 
provided that the director’s liabilities do not arise from a breach of 
the duty of loyalty or, the statute adds, from conduct “not in good 
faith.”28 Corporations rushed to adopt 102(b)(7) provisions after the 
section entered the Delaware code,29 with the practical effect of 
creating a dismissal right for shareholder claims under the duty of 
care.30 That section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code is designed to 
protect directors from liability for violating the duty of care can be 
gleaned from the statute itself—loyalty, after all, is carved out—but it 
is most clear when the statutory amendment is considered in light of 
the circumstances surrounding its adoption. 
The Delaware legislature adopted § 102(b)(7) in 1987 after the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom31 raised 
the risks of serving as a director of a Delaware corporation. In 
analyzing the conduct of the Trans Union board of directors under 
the duty of care, the court in Van Gorkom did not claim to change the 
law—the business judgment rule standard of gross negligence was 
                                                                                                                
Governance in America , 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 403 (1997) (framing corporate law in terms of “the 
tension between deference to directors’ decisions and the scope of judicial review”). 
 28. Under § 102(b)(7), there are four enumerated exclusions to the ability of a corporation 
to eliminate or limit director liability, including (i) breach of the duty of loyalty; (ii) acts or 
omissions not in good faith or involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law; 
(iii) unlawful payment of dividends; or (iv) self-interested transactions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,  
§ 102(b)(7) (1999). 
 29. See generally  Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987) (studying corporate adoption of § 102(b)(7) provisions after 
passage of the statute and finding, on the basis of event studies, no significant stock price 
reaction). 
 30. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999) (specifying that 
the corporation’s rights under the § 102(b)(7) provision is “in the nature of an affirmative 
defense”). 
 31. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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held to apply—but it applied the standard of gross negligence 
aggressively, resulting in an unprecedented finding that the board had 
breached it.32 The majority of commentators now agree that on the 
merits the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Trans 
Union board had been grossly negligent.33 Instead, the court’s 
strained interpretation of gross negligence suggested that courts, 
through similarly loose interpretations, might begin to have a voice in 
corporate governance notwithstanding the supposed constraint of the 
business judgment rule.34 
It is against this background that the legislature passed section 
102(b)(7), insulating directors from liability under the duty of care 
and, perhaps more importantly, cutting off any further growth in the 
court’s corporate governance jurisprudence. Because the dynamics of 
102(b)(7) created an immediate dismissal right for duty-of-care 
claims, there was no room for further innovation in the court’s 
corporate governance jurisprudence through loose interpretations of 
the gross negligence standard. The passage of 102(b)(7), in other 
words, was the legislature’s affirmation of the principle that the 
judiciary would stay out of corporate governance, provided that the 
board did not behave disloyally or, as the statute added, in bad faith. 
Unfortunately, the meaning of good faith in 102(b)(7) remains a 
mystery. The concept is defined neither in the statute nor in the 
legislative history. And, although canons of statutory construction 
suggest that the concept, because it appears as a separate numbered 
item,35 has some meaning distinct from loyalty and self-interest and 
that this meaning, judging by nearby words in the series,36 may have 
something to do with “intentional misconduct” or “knowing 
violations,” until recently the judiciary has done nothing to fill this 
statutory lacuna. 
The legislature is not alone in creating confusion around the 
meaning of good faith. Outside of the 102(b)(7) context, Delaware 
courts occasionally recite good faith as an aspect of the business 
                                                 
 32. Id. at 864. 
 33. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van 
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) (“Considered a legal 
disaster in 1985, it is judged no less disastrous today.” (citations, noting criticisms of the 
decision, omitted)). 
 34. The strain is evident in the majority opinion itself, which, in the words of the dissent, 
reads “like an adv ocate’s closing address to a hostile jury.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. 
 35. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 
233 (1975) (describing reddendo singular singulis—“referring each to each”).  
 36. Id. (describing noscitur a sociis—“known from its associates”).  
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judgment rule. It is here, however, that a distinct principle of good 
faith begins to clash with more established corporate law doctrines. In 
the standard formulation of the business judgment rule—that is, “a 
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company”37—the board’s good faith is part of what is presumed.38 The 
burden of disproving it, like the burden of challenging the adequacy 
of the board’s information or process, is allocated to the shareholder 
plaintiff. The standard that the plaintiff must meet to overcome this 
burden, however, is unclear. Should gross negligence be the standard 
for establishing lack of good faith, as it is for establishing a lack of 
information or other failure of the board’s duty of care? 
The question of what standard to apply to good faith begs the 
further question of what precisely the plaintiff is seeking to disprove. 
Is it really distinct from the collection of concerns customarily 
grouped under the categories of care and loyalty? If good faith is 
indistinct from concerns underlying traditional fiduciary duty 
analyses, then it may make sense to collapse the standard for good 
faith into the standard of care or loyalty. If, on the other hand, good 
faith is conceptualized as distinct from each of the traditional 
fiduciary duties, it may demand a new standard for rebutting the 
presumptions of the business judgment rule—a standard different 
from a showing of either gross negligence or an uncorrected conflict 
of interest.39 The question of good faith in corporate law is thus more 
than the question of defining terms in vague legislation. It is the 
question of creating a new standard under the business judgment rule 
and thereby realigning the balance between authority and 
accountability in corporate law jurisprudence. 
In spite of the importance of these questions and the magnitude 
of their implications, the Delaware courts seem not to have been 
interested in pursuing them. The mystery of good faith has been a 
part of Delaware law for as long as the business judgment rule. It has 
been an express component of the rule at least since the oft-cited 
Aronson formulation appeared in 1984 and an explicit part of the 
statute since it was amended in 1987. Yet the concept was unexplored 
                                                 
 37. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 38. See Arsht, supra note 2, at 662 (“Often the Delaware courts have framed the Business 
Judgment Rule as a presumption that the directors acted in good faith and in the honest belief 
that they were acting for the best interests of the corporation.” (citations omitted)). 
 39. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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for almost two decades, until the chancery court’s development of 
good faith jurisprudence in 2003. 
B. The Jurisprudence of Good Faith 
Many corporate law decisions discuss good faith,40 but a 
significant trend has emerged in a handful of recent decisions that not 
only discuss a fiduciary duty of good faith but also rely upon it as the 
basis of the decision. These cases suggest that good faith is more than 
just a new spin on old dicta. It is a ratio decidendi. Does this mean 
that the judiciary, having suddenly awakened to the puzzle of good 
faith in corporate law, has at last found a way to operationalize the 
principle in fiduciary duty analysis? 
The cases described in this Section develop Delaware’s recent 
jurisprudence of good faith. The leading opinion is the chancery 
court’s 2003 decision in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,41 
which established good faith as an independent basis of decision and 
represented the first effort by a Delaware court to engage in a 
sustained analysis of good faith as a principle of fiduciary duty.42 
After discussing Disney itself, this Section addresses Unsecured 
Creditors of Integrated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins,43 the first case 
to follow and apply the reasoning of Disney, and finally, discusses 
Levco Alternative Fund v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n,44 a Delaware 
Supreme Court decision that preceded the chancery court’s decision 
in Disney but which nevertheless suggests additional contexts for 
good faith analysis. 
1. Disney.  The Disney litigation revolved around the now 
infamous stint of Michael Ovitz as president of the Disney 
                                                 
 40. See, e.g., cases cited at supra note 5. See also Grogan v. O’Neil, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 
1293 (D. Kan. 2003) (treating good faith as the functional equivalent of waste and stating that 
“to prevail on either [breach of good faith or waste], plaintiff must show that the board’s 
decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of 
the corporation’s best interests”); Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch. Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 75 (De l. 
1997) (“Failure of an otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to act 
independently is a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith . . . .”). 
 41. 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 42. The opinion discussed in this Section and referred to throughout this Article as Disney 
is the chancery court’s 2003 decision that established good faith as an independent basis for a 
fiduciary duty complaint. The chancery court’s 2005 decision, after trial, is discussed at infra 
notes 285–306 and accompanying text. 
 43. C.A. No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004). 
 44. 803 A.2d 428 (Del. 2002). 
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Corporation. Michael Eisner, Disney’s CEO and a longtime friend of 
Ovitz, hand picked him for the job and insisted on his hiring over the 
objections of several Disney board members.45 Eisner personally 
handled many of the details of Ovitz’s hiring, including the 
negotiation of the employment agreement and, not long thereafter, 
the severance agreement.46 Ultimately, Ovitz’s tenure with Disney 
was brief and undistinguished. He left the company after fifteen 
months.47 His total compensation, however, was inversely 
proportional to the quality and quantity of his effort. For his pains, 
Ovitz was paid approximately $140 million in stock, cash, and 
options.48 
Not surprisingly, this rather lavish compensation package 
became the subject of a shareholder derivative suit against the Disney 
board. The case wended its way through the Delaware courts for 
years. After an initial dismissal by the court of chancery in 1998,49 the 
case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal in 2000 in 
Brehm v. Eisner.50 The Brehm opinion was strongly prodefendant, 
holding (1) that the board’s decisions to hire, fire, and compensate 
Ovitz, while certainly unfavorable to Disney,51 did not amount to 
                                                 
 45. Disney, 825 A.2d at 287. 
 46. Arguably, the most glaring error in the negotiation of the contracts was that the 
employment agreement created incentives for Ovitz to seek a no-fault termination rather than a 
long term relationship with the company. The chancery court summarized the situation as 
follows: 
Under a non-fault termination, Ovitz was to receive his salary for the remainder of 
the contract, discounted at a risk-free rate keyed to Disney’s borrowing costs. He was 
also to receive a $7.5 million bonus for each year remaining on his contract, 
discounted at the same risk-free rate, even though no set bonus amount was 
guaranteed in the contract. Additionally, all of his “A” stock options were to vest 
immediately, instead of waiting for the final three years of his contract for them to 
vest. The final benefit of the non-fault termination was a lump sum “termination 
payment” of $10 million. The termination payment was equal to the payment Ovitz 
would receive should he complete his full five-year term with Disney, but not receive 
an offer for a new contract. Graef Crystal opined in the January 13, 1997, edition of 
California Law Business that “the contract was most valuable to Ovitz the sooner he 
left Disney.” 
Id. at 283. 
 47. Id. at 282–85. 
 48. The measure is approximate due to the problem of valuing the equity and the options. 
$140 million is the plaintiff’s measurement of the total cost and may be high. See id. at 289 n.32 
(declining to decide the question of value). 
 49. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 50. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 51. The opinion noted that “the compensation and termination payout for Ovitz were 
exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious . . . and . . . the processes of the boards of directors in 
dealing with the approval and termination of the Ov itz Employment Agreement were casual, if 
not sloppy and perfunctory.” Id. at 249. 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
18 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1 
waste;52 (2) that outside of the context of waste, the court would not 
review the substantive outcome of board decisions;53 and (3) that the 
board’s decisionmaking process did not amount to gross negligence.54 
Expressing further sympathy for the defendants, Chief Justice Veasey 
emphasized the difference between ideal corporate governance 
practices and legally acceptable corporate governance practices: 
[T]he law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of 
those duties are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal 
corporate governance practices. Aspirational ideals of good 
corporate governance practices for boards of directors that go 
beyond the minimal legal requirements of the corporation law are 
highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes 
reduce litigation and can usually help directors avoid liability. But 
they are not required by the corporation law and do not define 
standards of liability.55 
There is a difference, in other words, between corporate law and 
corporate governance, a difference that is protected by the principle 
of judicial restraint underlying the business judgment rule. 
Nevertheless, the Brehm decision granted plaintiffs the 
opportunity to replead.56 The plaintiffs did so and found themselves in 
chancery court in early 2003, once again facing a motion to dismiss. 
By this point in the litigation, however, the duty-of-loyalty claim had 
been stripped from the plaintiffs’ complaint. It was now clear that 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 263–64. 
 53. There is no such thing, in other words, as substantive due care. In Chief Justice 
Veasey’s words: 
As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to exercise “substantive due 
care,” we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. 
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even 
decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context 
is process due care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule. 
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show 
that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business 
judgment rule. 
Id. at 264. It is worth noting the appearance of “good faith” at the end of this quotation. Chief 
Justice Veasey’s view, at least in Brehm, seems to have been that good faith is whatever is 
beyond the substantive standard of gross negligence, such as irrationality or waste. 
 54. Id. at 262 (concluding that the “pleading, as drafted, fails to create a reasonable doubt 
that the Old Board’s decision in approving the Ovitz Employment Agreement was protected by 
the business judgment rule”). 
 55. Id. at 256. 
 56. See id. at 248 (“[I]n the interests of justice, we reverse only to the extent of providing 
that one aspect of the dismissal shall be without prejudice, and we remand to the Court of 
Chancery to provide plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to file a further amended complaint 
consistent with this opinion.”).  
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apart from Eisner everyone on the Compensation Committee and the 
board as a whole was disinterested in the Ovitz hiring,57 that Eisner 
did not participate in the Compensation Committee’s review of the 
Ovitz contracts,58 and that there was no evidence suggesting Eisner 
dominated or controlled the board or the Compensation 
Committee.59 Without an argument under the duty of loyalty, the 
plaintiffs were left with only a duty-of-care claim, and Disney had a § 
102(b)(7) provision entitling the board to dismissal of claims arising 
exclusively under the duty of care.60 Without a loyalty component, the 
claim seemed to require dismissal. 
Instead of dismissing the revised complaint, however, Chancellor 
Chandler invoked good faith to rescue it, holding that the plaintiffs 
had pleaded “particularized facts sufficient to raise . . . a reason to 
doubt that the action was taken honestly and in good faith.”61 
Although the chancellor was able to invoke the good faith carve out 
in 102(b)(7) as the basis for his decision,62 this application of good 
faith was unprecedented in Delaware.63 Good faith had never before 
been given an independent doctrinal effect, but had typically been 
mentioned in the context of the other two duties, most often as an 
                                                 
 57. See Disney, 825 A.2d at 279–85 (describing the membership of the board and 
committee and their roles in reviewing the Ovitz hiring and termination decisions).  
 58. See id. at 280 (describing a meeting of Compensation Committee, of which Eisner was 
not a member). 
 59. See id. at 287 n.30 (noting that the friendship between Eisner and Ovitz is “not 
mentioned to show self-interest or domination,” which the court in fact never analyzed).  
 60. See supra Part I.A. 
 61. Disney, 825 A.2d at 286. 
 62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (1999) (providing that indemnification 
provisions shall not eliminate or limit director liability for conduct “not in good faith”). 
 63. The Seventh Circuit, however, applying Illinois law, had recently sustained a claim on 
precisely the same basis. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (invoking good faith as an exception to the corporation’s 102(b)(7) provision). The 
Abbott decision involved a board’s persistent failure to comply with government regulation and 
followed Chancellor Allen’s often-cited dictum in the Caremark opinion that: 
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated upon 
ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a sustained or 
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish 
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability. 
In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). These statements are 
technically dicta because the only “holding” of the Caremark opinion is the approval of a 
settlement in a derivative action under the duty of care. In basing its decision on these remarks, 
the Abbott court ultimately concluded that “a sustained and systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight” can raise doubts concerning the board’s exercise of its duties in good faith. 
Abbott Labs. , 325 F.3d at 809. 
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aspect of the duty of loyalty.64 In Disney, however, good faith is 
separate and distinct from both loyalty and care because the 
plaintiffs’ claim could not have survived dismissal under either 
traditional fiduciary duty.65 
Having thus given good faith a new role in fiduciary duty 
analysis, the Disney opinion then had to demonstrate how good faith 
analyses would work. Although Chancellor Chandler made several 
references to recklessness and intentional disregard,66 throughout the 
opinion he applied an analytic technique that essentially alternated 
between issues traditionally raised in analyses under the duty of 
loyalty, on the one hand, and the duty of care, on the other. This 
alternation between loyalty issues and care issues is the opinion’s 
most distinctive feature. 
Loyalty, in the form of the Eisner-Ovitz relationship, is a theme 
that recurs throughout the chancellor’s opinion. Beginning in the 
recitation of facts and continuing throughout the opinion, the 
chancellor expressed skepticism at the role that the friendship 
between the two men might have played in the corporation’s 
decisionmaking.67 The opinion emphasizes the friendship over and 
over again, repeating the word “friend” or “friendship” fifteen times, 
always in reference to the Eisner-Ovitz relationship and usually 
accompanied by remarks expressing thinly veiled displeasure if not 
outright criticism. For example, in describing the negotiation of the 
initial employment agreement, Chancellor Chandler notes that the 
                                                 
 64. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 65. There was no basis under the duty of loyalty because it had not been raised on appeal 
and no basis under the duty of care because the court was prevented—by the business judgment 
rule and the 102(b)(7) provision—from reaching it. 
 66. Near the end of the opinion, Chancellor Chandler stated: 
[T]he facts alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant directors 
consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t 
care about the risks’ attitude  . . . . Knowing or deliberate indifference . . . to [the 
director’s] duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not 
have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the 
company. Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the defendant 
directors knew that they were making material decisions without adequate 
information and without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if 
the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss. 
Disney, 825 A.2d at 289. The focus on recklessness and intentional disregard is similar to the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Abbott. See supra  note 63. 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 279 (noting, for the first of many times throughout the opinion, that 
Ovitz ha d “been Eisner’s close friend for over twenty-five years”). 
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board “passed off the details to Ovitz and his good friend, Eisner.”68 
Later, in connection with Ovitz’s termination, the chancellor again 
emphasizes the personal relationship, noting that “[Ovitz’s] good 
friend Eisner came to the rescue, agreeing to Ovitz’s request for a 
non-fault termination”69 and pointing out that “Eisner [handed] his 
personal friend, Ovitz, more than $38 million in cash and the three 
million . . . stock options.”70 
The Eisner-Ovitz relationship, however, falls short of 
establishing a breach of the duty of loyalty. Even if one accepts that a 
personal relationship can disqualify a director as disinterested,71 the 
only member of the Disney board to flunk the test was Eisner, and 
none of the usual indicia of “domination or control” were present to 
suggest that Eisner’s conflict had spread to the rest of the board.72 If 
anything, the facts recited in the opinion suggest a healthy degree of 
skepticism on the part of the board, three of whose members raised 
objections to Ovitz’s hiring.73 But the chancellor never pursued these 
lines of analysis. The loyalty analysis, in other words, is highly 
incomplete. Without more, these items would fail to establish liability 
under the duty of loyalty. No more is given, however, because the 
chancellor is not raising the Eisner-Ovitz friendship to prove a breach 
of the duty of loyalty, but rather as a relevant component of the 
analysis of good faith.74 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 287. The court repeated its emphasis on this point, noting that “[n]egotiation over 
the remaining terms took place solely between Eisner, Ovitz, and attorneys representing Disney 
and Ov itz.” Id. 
 69. Id. at 288. 
 70. Id. at 289. The court again described the role of the Eisner-Ovitz friendship in the 
transaction with disapproval when it described Ovitz as having gone “to his close friend, 
Eisner,” with whom he had worked to “develop[] a secret strategy that would enable Ovitz to 
extract the maximum benefit from his contract, all without board approval.” Id. at 291. 
 71. Nonmonetary ties are now increasingly viewed as adequate to disqualify a director as 
independent and disinterested. See, for example, In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 
917, 938–39 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Beholden . . . does not mean just owing in the financial sense, it 
can also flow out of ‘pe rsonal or other relationships’ to the interested party.”), which is 
discussed at infra note 220. 
 72. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 73. Disney, 825 A.2d at 287. 
 74. See id. at 287 n.30: 
The allegation that Eisner and Ovitz had been close friends for over twenty-five years 
is not mentioned to show self-interest or domination. Instead, the allegation is 
mentioned because it casts doubt on the good faith and judgment behind the . . . 
decisions to allow two close personal friends to control the payment of shareholders’ 
money to Ovitz. 
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Between the recurring references to the Eisner-Ovitz friendship, 
the Disney opinion focuses on the board’s process in approving the 
Ovitz contracts, an issue traditionally considered under the rubric of 
the duty of care. Criticizing the approval of Ovitz’s initial 
employment contract, the chancellor emphasized that it had been 
approved without the entire board or any committee having had any 
role in the negotiations or signing.75 Reciting a series of facts recalling 
the criticism of Trans Union’s two hour board meeting in Van 
Gorkom,76 the court stressed that the “[b]oard and the compensation 
committee . . . each spent less than an hour reviewing Ovitz’s possible 
hiring.”77 Twice the court cited with approval the plaintiff’s allegation 
that the board behaved “blindly”78 and once referred to the board as 
“ostrich-like.”79 According to the court’s reading of the factual 
allegations, the board “chose to remain invisible in the process. . . . 
[and] (1) failed to ask why it had not been informed, (2) failed to 
inquire about the conditions and terms of the agreement; and (3) 
failed even to attempt to stop or delay the termination until more 
information could be collected.”80 As in Van Gorkom, such 
allegations would typically form the basis of a complaint under the 
duty of care, but the court did not pursue the analysis, perhaps 
because the business judgment rule and the 102(b)(7) provision would 
                                                 
 75. Id. at 288 (describing the process and stating that “the board apparently took no action; 
no questions were asked”). 
 76. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868 (Del. 1985) (holding a board liable under 
the duty of care in connection with the approval of a merger). 
 77. Disney, 825 A.2d at 288 (emphasis added). The court further emphasized that 
neither the Old Board nor the compensation committee reviewed the actual draft 
employment agreement. Nor did they evaluate the details of Ovitz’s salary or his 
severance provisions. No expert presented the board with details of the agreement, 
outlined the pros and cons of either the salary or non-fault termination provisions, or 
analyzed comparable industry standards for such agreements. Notwithstanding this 
alleged information vacuum, the Old Board and the compensation committee 
approved Ovitz’s hiring, appointed Eisner to negotiate with Ovitz directly in drafting 
the unresolved terms of his employment, never asked to review the final terms, and 
were never voluntarily provided those terms. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Again, these concerns echo the Delaware Supreme Court’s concerns 
eighteen years earlier in Van Gorkom, in which the Trans Union board approved merger 
without a draft merger agreement or written summary and without an expert fairness opinion. 
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877–78. 
 78. Disney, 825 A.2d at 277, 289. 
 79. Id. at 288. 
 80. Id. at 289. 
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have kept it from getting very far.81 Instead, the court raised these 
issues to support the board’s lack of good faith. 
What, then, does the chancery court’s 2003 Disney opinion teach 
about good faith? At the very least, by sustaining the claim on the 
basis of good faith when neither care nor loyalty was available, 
Disney shows that good faith has a doctrinal effect that is independent 
of either traditional fiduciary duty. The mode of analysis that Disney 
supplies for good faith claims, however, is closely tied to the 
traditional fiduciary duties. This mode of analysis can be summarized 
(somewhat glibly) as follows: First, recite facts drawing both the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty into question. Then, rather than 
pursuing either traditional analysis through to a conclusion, alternate 
between the two and, in so doing, blend the issues together. Having 
thus formed a composite picture of the board’s conduct, conclude that 
the analysis raises doubts concerning the good faith of the defendant 
directors. 
2. Elkins.  A similar mixing of the duties of care and loyalty 
took place in a still more recent chancery court decision claiming to 
follow and apply the chancellor’s reasoning in Disney. 
In Elkins, the unsecured creditors’ committee of bankrupt 
Integrated Health Services (IHS) pressed fiduciary duty claims 
against members of the IHS board in connection with the 
compensation package awarded to Robert Elkins, the company’s 
president and CEO. Although this package was not as lavish as 
Michael Ovitz’s pay day in Disney,82 Elkins benefited from a number 
of dubious compensation arrangements, including a large bonus, 
option grants, and various loans, the terms of which were regularly 
revised to make them more favorable to Elkins.83 The plaintiff 
claimed that the IHS board breached the fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty in authorizing the Elkins compensation package.84 The 
                                                 
 81. See supra Part I.A. Chancellor Chandler’s awareness of this dynamic is evident in his 
statement in Disney: “Where a director consciously ignores his or her duties to the 
corporation . . . the director’s actions are either ‘not in good faith’ or ‘involve intentional 
misconduct.’ Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations support claims that fall outside the liability waiver 
provided under Disney’s certificate of incorporation.” Disney, 825 A.2d at 290 (footnote 
omitted). 
 82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 83. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A. 
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *13–*25 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004). 
 84. See id. at *29 (“One [count] alleges breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the 
second alleges breach of the fiduciary duty of care.”). 
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defense moved for dismissal of the duty-of-loyalty claim on the 
ground that each of the compensation arrangements had been 
approved by a majority of disinterested and independent directors;85 
after analyzing the interest and independence of each board member, 
the court agreed.86 This left only the duty-of-care claim, which, given 
the IHS 102(b)(7) provision, seemed to require dismissal. As in 
Disney, however, the Elkins court relied on the bad faith exception to 
102(b)(7) in denying the motion to dismiss.87 
Although it claimed to follow and apply Disney, the Elkins court 
expressed some confusion over whether analyses of good faith belong 
under the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.88 The court resolved this 
confusion by pointing out that good faith analyses could be 
conceptualized as belonging under either traditional duty. Good faith 
can be viewed as a part of the duty of loyalty, the court pointed out, 
because “[a] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation 
unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the 
corporation’s best interest.”89 Alternately, good faith may be viewed 
as a component of the duty of care if the defect is a process failure, 
requiring an inquiry into what the board did or did not do to prevent 
the loss.90 That the court paused to describe good faith both ways—
and that it located each interpretation in alternative readings of 
Disney—suggests once again that good faith has elements of each 
traditional fiduciary duty. 
Despite its conceptual subtlety in describing good faith, the 
court’s actual analysis of good faith is a fairly plain review of the 
board processes involved in the approval of each element of the 
compensation package. Unlike the Disney court, the court in Elkins 
did not continually alternate between the two traditional duties, nor 
                                                 
 85. Id. at *30; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2001) (allowing a transaction 
involving a corporation and one of its directors if a majority of disinterested directors with 
knowledge of material facts regarding the involved director’s interests approve of the 
transa ction).  
 86. See Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122,  at *43 (concluding that “all of these transactions 
were approved by a board consisting of a majority of independent, disinterested directors”). 
 87. Id. at 63;  see also In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (relying on the bad faith exception in 102(b)(7) to deny dismissal). 
 88. Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *31–*34. 
 89. Id. at *33 n.36 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
 90. See id. at *34 n.37 (“One may alternatively conceptualize the holding in Disney as a 
duty of care claim that is so egregious—that essentially alleges the Board abdicated its 
responsibility to make any busine ss decision—that it falls within the second exception to the 
general exculpating power of § 102(b)(7).”). 
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did it even describe its review as an analysis of good faith; it referred 
instead to what it called the “Disney Standard”91 and repeatedly 
quoted the phrase from Disney that a board may not “consciously and 
intentionally disregard[] [its] responsibilities.”92 In its review of the 
board’s process in approving Elkins’ compensation arrangements, the 
court then dismissed claims wherever it found evidence of 
deliberation, and sustained them where it found none.93 
The mode of analysis employed in Elkins, where evidence of 
board processes are reviewed to either dismiss or sustain elements of 
the complaint, if reduced to the principle that the board spend a 
reasonable amount of time and effort in deliberation, is inconsistent 
with the business judgment rule, which requires only that the board 
not behave with gross negligence. How much time and effort to spend 
in deliberation is a board decision that, like the decision to make 
bottles or bricks, is a matter of business judgment insulated from 
judicial second guessing.94 Even without sliding all the way towards 
the reductio ad absurdum—where, for example, a board must meet 
for more than two hours to approve a merger (a lesson arguably 
imparted by Van Gorkom), one hour for CEO compensation, twenty 
minutes for plant closure95—a court that passes judgment on the 
reasonableness of board deliberations violates the principle of 
nonintervention underlying the business judgment rule.96 Vice 
Chancellor Noble sought to avoid this inconsistency by emphasizing 
that his court was looking not for evidence of the reasonableness of 
deliberations but only for an indication that deliberations had taken 
                                                 
 91. Id. at *44. 
 92. Id. at *46; see id. at *44 (describing the relevant question as “whether any of the 
Challenged Transactions was authorized with . . . intentional and conscious disregard to [the] 
director’s duties); id. at *46 (stating that to survive dismissal, the pleading must state facts 
implying that “a Board ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded [its] responsibilities’”); id. at 
*48–*49 (failing to find evidence “that the Defendants intentionally disregarded their 
responsibilities”). 
 93. See id. at *46–*59. 
 94. Cf. CLARK, supra note 21, at 641 (discussing the decision to make bottles or bricks in 
the context of derivative suits). 
 95. The Elkins court noted this possibility, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument about the 
reasonableness of time spent: 
Counsel took the following position: “Now we’re not saying if it was 20 minutes, it 
would have been okay or if it was 5 minutes, it wouldn’t have been okay. Perhaps 5 or 
10 minutes would have been sufficient if there had been some other involvement or 
discussion with the expert other than that very brief meeting.” The type of inquiry 
counsel may be suggesting is not particularly helpful in evaluating a fiduciary claim. 
Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *52 (footnote omitted).  
 96. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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place at all.97 One might ask, however, whether the decision not to 
deliberate at all, like the decision to deliberate for ten minutes or 
twenty, is not also a business decision, insulated from judicial second 
guessing by the business judgment rule. But, perhaps, the answer to 
this question depends on the unique context of executive 
compensation. 
In other contexts, boards may decide not to deliberate—that is, 
they may defer to management’s judgment—but not in questions of 
executive compensation. Elkins states: “While there may be instances 
in which a board may act with deference to corporate officers’ 
judgments, executive compensation is not one of those instances. The 
board must exercise its own business judgment in approving an 
executive compensation transaction.”98 Why is executive 
compensation different? Why is board deference appropriate in other 
matters but not here? The answer, obviously, is that management has 
an overwhelming interest in setting its own compensation as high as it 
possibly can and cannot be trusted to act in the best interests of the 
corporation. Because of this conflict of interest, the board cannot 
simply defer to management’s judgment. 
Executive compensation, in other words, is a special case in 
which management’s loyalty cannot be assumed.99 If the board does 
not exercise its own judgment to constrain management, there is no 
way to be confident that the resulting decision is not the product of 
self-interest. Here again, in other words, there is a duty-of-loyalty 
concern. Executive compensation is a special case for scrutiny of the 
board’s “good faith”—that is, a situation in which the process 
requirements of the duty of care will be especially scrutinized for 
what is, at its core, a duty-of-loyalty problem. In Elkins, the duties of 
care and loyalty are interrelated not only as bases from which good 
faith may be conceptualized; they are also intermixed as the 
motivating concerns of the analysis. Concerns about loyalty 
(management’s interest in maximizing its own compensation) drive 
the court’s duty-of-care analysis (board processes). 
                                                 
 97. Elkins, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *52 (“The Court does not look at the 
reasonableness of a Board’s actions in this context, as long as the Board exercised some business 
judgment.”). 
 98. Id. at *45. 
 99. See generally LUCIAN AYRE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) 
(diagnosing the excesses of executive compensation as a function of the fact that managers, 
through boards they control, set their own compe nsation). 
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3. Reader’s Digest.  Executive compensation issues, however, 
are not the only ones to trigger good faith analyses, and the chancery 
court is not the only Delaware court to perform them. At the supreme 
court level, a very similar analytic technique appears just beneath the 
surface of Reader’s Digest, in which the court performed a good faith 
analysis without naming it as such.100 
The transaction inciting the litigation was a proposed 
recapitalization of the Reader’s Digest Association (RDA), the effect 
of which would have been to eliminate RDA’s dual capital 
structure—two classes of shares, one with voting rights and the other 
without, but otherwise identical—in favor of a single class of common 
stock with one vote per share.101 However, the proposed 
recapitalization created a conflict-of-interest problem because a 
control group stood to gain $100 million cash in a buyback of shares 
unavailable to any other RDA shareholders.102 The control group 
buyback would thus result in a $100 million decrease in the equity 
interests of the nonvoting shareholders.103 
In a somewhat cryptic order enjoining the proposed 
recapitalization,104 the supreme court emphasized two elements of the 
transaction. First, in treating the share buyback as the “key to the 
                                                 
 100. Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. 466, 2002 Del. LEXIS 
488, at *6–*8 (Del. Aug. 13, 2002). 
 101. Id. at *2. The recapitalization also would have added antitakeover prov isions. See infra 
note 110. 
 102. The control group consisted of two large funds that together owned fifty percent of 
RDA’s voting shares: the DeWitt Wallace Reader’s Digest Fund and the Lila Wallace Reader’s 
Digest Fund. In connection with the recapitalization, RDA would purchase 3,636,363 shares 
held by the funds. As a result of the repurchase and recapitalization, the funds would go from 
holding 50 percent of RDA voting rights to holding 14 percent. Reader’s Digest, 2002 Del. 
LEXIS 488, at *2. 
 103. Id. at *6. The court explicitly emphasized the already -tenuous financial condition of the 
corporation in connection with the additional debt burden required to buy shares back from the 
controlling group. See id. (noting the company’s “tenuous financial condition, having recently 
committed to a large acquisition, incurring additional debt in order to pay $100 million to the 
Class B shareholders”). 
 104. The Reader’s Digest opinion is unclear regarding, among other things, the standard of 
review applied by the court. The plaintiffs challenged both the fairness of the transaction and 
the process of the board committee in agreeing to it. Reversing the chancery court on the 
question whether the entire fairness standard was appropriate, the supreme court acknowledged 
that the burden of showing fairness, although initially resting with the defendants, would shift if 
the committee was genuinely independent. In reviewing the committee’s actions, however, the 
court found them to be “flawed both from the standpoint of process and price.” Id. at *5. The 
court then employed an analysis mixing duty-of-loyalty issues with duty-of-care issues to review 
the conduct of the committee. Id. at *6–*8. 
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recapitalization,”105 the court focused on the conflict inherent in 
taking an action to benefit a control group to the exclusion of, and at 
the expense of, other shareholders.106 Second, the court criticized the 
process undertaken by the board and its committees in approving the 
transaction, admonishing the board for failing to engage a financial 
advisor to provide a fairness opinion specifically addressing the 
interests of the nonvoting shareholders.107 
As in Disney, the supreme court’s analysis of these issues 
fluctuated between considerations traditionally raised under duty-of-
loyalty (the interest of the controlling shareholders in the buyback) 
and duty-of-care (the information asked for and obtained by the 
committee) analyses. Having opened both cans of worms, the court 
ultimately disposed of neither. The court never fully addressed the 
influence of the controlling shareholders’ interest on the committee, 
nor did it analyze whether the board’s process fell short of the 
standard of care. Instead, it blended both sets of issues in enjoining 
the proposed recapitalization.108 This is similar to the analysis of good 
faith that later emerged in the chancery court’s Disney opinion, in 
which the court oscillated between each traditional analysis without 
resolving either one. Moreover, when the Reader’s Digest court 
addressed the board committee’s claim that it acted in the best 
interests of the corporation,109 it did so with evident skepticism, noting 
that the committee’s belief was “perhaps in good faith.”110 
                                                 
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. The crux of the court’s reasoning with respect to process was that the committee failed 
to consider the “specific impact” of the reorganization on each of the former classes of 
shareholders, focusing instead on the effect of the transaction on RDA as a whole. See id. at *5 
(stating that although the committee “believed it was operating in the interests of the 
corporation as an entity” and noting that “the committee’s functioning, to the extent it was 
required to balance the conflicting interests of two distinct classes of shareholders, was flawed”). 
 107. See id. at *6–*7 (“To the extent that the directors did not secure sufficient information 
concerning the effect of the recapitalization premium on the Class A shareholders, a serious 
question is raised concerning the discharge of their duty of care.”). 
 108. See id. at *7 (stating that “where, as here, the need for protection outweighs possible 
detriment to the defendants if the transaction does not proceed immediately the injunction 
should issue”). 
 109. Id. at *6. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). Is this “perhaps” meant to imply skepticism of the board’s good 
faith? There is, at any rate, ample reason to be skeptical. In addition to the $100 million 
giveaway to the control group, the recapitalization added antitakeover provisions in a manner 
reminiscent of what Professor Gordon has referred to as “opportunistic amendment”—by 
packaging charter terms that harm shareholder welfare along with terms that have positive or 
ambiguous welfare effects. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1577–81 (1989) (describing strategic use of “sweeteners,” “add-ons,” 
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C. The Substance of Good Faith 
In spite of having been made the ratio decidendi in several recent 
decisions, the precise meaning of good faith remains unclear. None of 
the cases assigning a distinct doctrinal role to good faith in fiduciary 
duty analyses has fully specified the steps of that analysis. None has 
filled in the content of the emerging doctrine. In the words of former 
Chief Justice Veasey, “the jurisprudence of good faith is 
unresolved.”111 
Several of the cases recite the language of recklessness and 
intentional disregard in describing bad-faith conduct. In Disney, for 
example, the court emphasizes that “[k]nowing or deliberate 
indifference . . . to [the director’s] duty to act faithfully and with 
appropriate care is conduct . . . that may not have been taken honestly 
and in good faith to advance the best interests of the company.”112 
Elkins claims to apply this test, referring to the standard of 
“intentional and conscious disregard to [the] director’s duties”113 
rather than the more general question of good faith. Building upon 
such language, Professor Hillary Sale has articulated an analysis for 
good faith that focuses on questions of intent, arguing that directors 
fail to act in good faith “when they abdicate, subvert, or ignore [their] 
responsibilities, or act with deliberate indifference toward them.”114 
Elaborating this standard, Sale states: 
Good faith based liability . . . moves the bar from negligent behavior 
to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing 
behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the 
actors. . . . Two of the cases . . . that discuss good faith indicate that a 
breach of the duty requires motive-based allegations of severely 
                                                                                                                
and “chicken” tactics and noting that “insiders can bundle a wealth-reducing amendment 
with . . . an unrelated proposal that increases shareholder wealth”). In Reader’s Digest, the 
proposed recapitalization packaged a staggered board and the elimination of shareholder ability 
to act by written consent, well-recognized antitakeover provisions, with increased voting power. 
See Reader’s Digest, 2002 Del. LEXIS 488, at *2 (describing the terms of the recapitalization 
plan). See generally  Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (discussing the antitakeover 
effect of staggered boards and the inability of shareholders to act by written consent). An 
awareness of the potential for opportunism beneath the surface of such a charter amendment 
may have caused the supreme court to doubt the good faith of the RDA board. 
 111. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the 
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 448 (2003).  
 112. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 113. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A. 
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *44 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).  
 114. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 486 (2004). 
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reckless or seemingly intentional behavior. Situations involving 
deliberate indifference or abdication would also cross the line.115 
To define the requisite mental state of recklessness or deliberate 
indifference, Sale argues that courts hearing corporate law cases 
ought to follow the lead of the federal securities laws and, in 
particular, the development of scienter in litigation under rule  
10b-5.116 She then offers several situations that illustrate a state of 
mind—intentional disregard or extreme recklessness117—which would 
enable a court to find liability under a separate standard of good 
faith.118 Professor Sale’s analysis of good faith has recently been cited 
with approval in a chancery court decision.119 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to resist an explanation of 
good faith that would reduce its amorphous character to a standard 
based on intent or, perhaps, based on anything else. First, the resolute 
fact specificity of Delaware jurisprudence has continually frustrated 
attempts to harden fiduciary standards into clear rules.120 Delaware’s 
                                                 
 115. Id. at 488–89 (footnotes omitted).  
 116. Id. at 489–94. Elaborating the use of scienter, Professor Sale states: 
Under such a standard, known or obvious infractions of corporate rules or 
governance standards, or failures to create such standards, would be actionable. 
Fiduciaries who fail to perform assigned tasks and to set up mechanisms to ensure 
that they are aware of such tasks would also be actionable. And, of course, good faith 
reliance on the reports or information of others would still defeat such claims. 
Id. at 490. 
 117. These include situations in which the directors (1) “benefited in a concrete and 
personal way from the purported fraud,” (2) “engaged in deliberately illegal behavior,” (3) 
“knew facts or had access to information” that indicated the information they relied upon was 
inaccurate, or (4) failed “to check on information they had a duty to monitor.” Id. at 491–93 
(quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 118. In Professor Sale’s words: 
Although a breach of good faith need not be intentional or conscious, it does require 
some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure. . . . [M]otive is relevant, but not 
required. Intentional misstatements or omissions are actionable and intentional 
breaches of fiduciary duties should be as well. But, as the Disney cases make clear, 
allegations of unintentional but flagrantly reckless actions or inactions are also 
problematic and, if proved, are breaches of good faith responsibilities. 
Id. at 493–94. 
 119. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. Civ. Action.A. No. 16415, 
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, *142–*43 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (citing Professor Sale’s article with 
approval and criticizing directors for “consciously disregarding” shareholder interests when they 
“knew, or at the very least had strong reasons to believe,” that a transaction was unfair). 
 120. Allen, Jacobs, & Strine , supra note 20, at 1294: 
[T]he almost infinite potential variation in the fact patterns calling for director 
decisions, the disparate time frames within which different boards may be required to 
act, and the divergent skills and information needed to ma ke particular business 
decisions, usually make it impossible for courts to articulate ex ante precise guidelines 
for appropriate fiduciary action in future cases. 
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recent history is no exception. As I discuss in further detail in Part II, 
at the same time that Delaware courts were rediscovering the concept 
of good faith, they were destabilizing settled doctrinal paradigms in 
the areas of change of control121 and director independence.122 It 
would be odd indeed if in the same year that Delaware eschewed 
doctrinal stability in these other areas, it settled the previously 
amorphous notion of good faith around a core concept of scienter. 
At another level, defining good faith in terms of recklessness or 
intent does not solve the problem of distinguishing good faith from 
the duty of care. Because intent and recklessness can be characterized 
as negligence and negligence similarly can be recast as intent, either 
analysis will ultimately ask whether the board was careful or prudent 
according to some standard of conduct. Questions of negligence and 
intent both focus on how individuals direct their attention. Because 
attention is a scarce resource—there are too many perceptual 
influences (whether sensory experiences, intellectual puzzles, 
memories, or distractions) to focus on all of them at once—
individuals must choose how to direct their attention. They must 
decide, in other words, what they will pay attention to and what they 
will disregard. This decision can be characterized equally as 
intentional or negligent. In the context of driving, for example, I 
might have to decide how to allocate my attention between the road 
and a conversation on my cell phone. If I choose to talk and drive and 
subsequently cause an accident, my decision can be described as 
negligent driving or, just as easily, as intentional disregard of the road 
in favor of an engrossing conversation. Negligence merely sets the 
                                                                                                                
After attempting to organize fragmented decisions into a single coherent doctrine, two 
distinguished commentators accurately predicted what would come of their prediction: 
“Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior case law is like watching clouds. They seem, 
at times, to take on recognizable shapes and forms, even to resemble something familiar. But 
you know that whatever shapes you think you see can vanish in a puff of wind.” Lawrence A. 
Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: 
A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593, 1626 (1994). 
 121. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933–39 (2003) (applying 
enhanced scrutiny of deal protection devices and requiring that merger agreements contain a 
fiduciary out). Omnicare is further discussed at infra note 220. For a full discussion of the 
Omnicare opinion and its several departures from existing doctrine, see generally Sean J. 
Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS 
Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569 (2004). 
 122. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937–39 (Del. Ch. 2003) (relaxing 
the traditional tests of director independence in the context of derivative suits). Oracle is further 
discussed at infra  note 220. 
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standard of reasonable attention in doing something,123 but the 
decision to direct one’s attention can still be understood as a question 
of intent—that is, the choice to allocate attention to one place rather 
than another.124 
Tort law distinctions between negligence and intent—in which, 
for example, someone intends to tap, not to kill, an “egg-shell skull” 
plaintiff—do not work in the context of board decisionmaking.125 
Whatever the board is deciding, its intent, consistent with fiduciary 
principles, is always the same—to maximize corporate welfare. To 
frame the question of whether they are doing it as they ought to as a 
matter of recklessness or intentional disregard is merely to conduct 
the negligence inquiry under another label. Moreover, because the 
business judgment rule eliminates the negligence standard in 
corporate law,126 conducting such an inquiry is inconsistent with 
settled doctrine. Any attempt to distinguish the recklessness inquiry 
by limiting it to extreme deviations from the norm must encounter the 
objection that corporate law already has doctrines, such as gross 
negligence and waste,127 for dealing with extremes.128 Chief Justice 
Veasey’s strident rejection of substantive due care in Brehm means 
that a bad outcome, short of waste, cannot be a basis for liability.129 
And the business judgment rule means that misdirected attention, 
short of gross negligence, cannot give rise to liability.130 Once intent is 
                                                 
 123. Consider the Hand formula: the burden of care should equal the probability of loss 
times the magnitude of harm. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d 
Cir. 1947) (developing the Hand formula : “[i]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the 
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P”). 
 124. Another way of saying the same thing is to say that negligence is merely misdirected 
attention. We say that attention is misdirected when it is significantly diverted towards 
something else, leaving a less-than-reasonable residual allocation of attention on the action that 
caused the harm. 
 125. This distinction does not work well in torts either, where defendants are said to take 
their victims as they find them, whatever they actually intended. See, e.g., Bruneau v. Quick, 447 
A.2d 742, 750 (Conn. 1982) (stating that “defendant took the  plaintiff as he found her”). 
 126. See supra Part I.A. 
 127. See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that “waste 
entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie 
beyond the range of what any reasonable pe rson might be willing to trade”); Francis v. United 
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 819–26 (N.J. 1981) (demonstra ting that a director’s alcoholic stupor 
can result in gross negligence).  
 128. Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Disney board’s action 
in the context of the Ovitz compensation dispute was neither gross negligence nor waste. See 
supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra Part I.A. 
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collapsed back into negligence, a scienter-based standard of good 
faith thus merely repeats the analytics of the duty of care. Moreover, 
if this standard seeks to apply a test other than gross negligence or 
waste, it is inconsistent with the business judgment rule. 
It may be that a rewrite of the business judgment rule is just what 
advocates of a scienter-based duty of good faith have in mind, 
perhaps for valid normative reasons.131 My only point here is a 
descriptive one—that is, to point out that moving good faith to a 
substantive standard of intent does not avoid repitition of duty-of-
care analytics and, ultimately, confrontation with the business 
judgment rule. Furthermore, again as a purely descriptive matter, 
reducing good faith to a substantive standard of intent does not fully 
capture the more subtle pattern of analysis in the good faith cases. 
True, several courts have said that good faith involves questions of 
intent and recklessness, but they have not seriously attempted to 
probe the directors’ subjective mental state.132 Instead, what courts 
have done in analyzing good faith is to raise issues under each of the 
traditional fiduciary duties, mix them together, then conclude that the 
board’s conduct has thrown good faith into doubt. It is difficult to 
reduce this pattern of analysis to scienter or perhaps to any 
substantive standard, and attempts to do so are subject to the 
criticism that they credit what courts say without paying adequate 
attention to what courts do. 
In the next Part, I seek to provide a more accurate account of the 
recent good faith jurisprudence. It attempts to describe good faith in a 
way that does not reduce it to a substantive doctrine with a rigid core 
principle. Good faith, it argues, is not a substantive standard. It is a 
rhetorical device. 
                                                 
 131. Professor Sale, for example, argues that good faith can improve corporate governance 
by breaking hardened doctrinal paradigms: 
The value of a separate good faith duty . . . is in its potential for addressing those 
outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduciary behavior that are not simply the 
results of bad process or conflicts. And, of course, its real value is not simply in the 
compensation it can provide to, for example, Disney shareholders, but in the ex ante 
role it can play in changing the behavior and incentives of corporate fiduciaries and, 
thereby changing corporate governance. 
Sale, supra note 114, at 494. As mentioned at supra note 16, it is debatable whether increasing 
board accountability to courts—whether through good faith or any other jurisprudential tool—
will improve corporate governance by more than it costs. 
 132. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consul. Civ. Action.A. No. 
16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, *145 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (a cknowledging that “divining the 
operations of a person’s mind is an inherently elusive endeavor”). 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
34 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1 
II.  GOOD FAITH AS A RHETORICAL DEVICE 
Good faith, in my view, is not now and is not likely ever to 
become a doctrine of subrules and multipart tests. It is more subtle 
and elusive. It has, at its core, the basic concern of all corporate law 
jurisprudence—the question whether directors are really doing their 
best in acting for the corporation—but in seeking an answer, it blends 
questions generally thought to arise under the duty of care with those 
arising under the duty of loyalty. In seeking to answer the basic 
corporate law question, courts applying the good faith standard do 
not confine themselves to the analytics of either traditional fiduciary 
duty. Instead, good faith is used as a loose rhetorical device that 
courts can wield to find liability or enjoin actions that do not quite fit 
within established doctrinal categories. In this Part, I develop my 
account of good faith as a rhetorical device. Focusing on the pattern 
of analysis in the recent cases, Section A identifies the interpretive 
methodology underlying good faith jurisprudence as “thaumatrope 
analytics.” Section B then emphasizes the contextual contingency of 
the good faith cases, an aspect of the good faith thaumatrope that will 
serve to connect it, in the next Part, to other evolutionary shifts in 
corporate law jurisprudence. 
A. Thaumatrope Analytics 
To understand the jurisprudence of good faith, it is important 
first to understand the pattern of analysis in the recent good faith 
cases. Good faith analyses oscillate between elements that 
traditionally sound under either of the two traditional fiduciary 
duties, care and loyalty. 
In the Disney opinion, for example, Chancellor Chandler 
analyzed the board’s good faith by emphasizing elements both of 
loyalty and care, describing the stages of the board’s decisionmaking 
process, but continually returning to remark on the relationship 
between “Ovitz and his good friend, Eisner.”133 Process review is, of 
course, duty-of-care review, whereas conflict issues raise loyalty 
concerns.134 In its good faith analysis, the chancery court oscillated 
between the two modes of analysis, repeatedly raising both care and 
loyalty concerns without pursuing either to a conclusion, but rather 
switching between both to raise doubts concerning the good faith of 
                                                 
 133. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 287–89 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 134. See supra Part I.A. 
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the board.135 Distinctions between the duties of care and loyalty were 
similarly blurred in Elkins,136 where the court conceptualized good 
faith as a component of each of the traditional fiduciary duties and 
then applied an analysis that resembled the duty of care but that was 
motivated by concerns arising under the duty of loyalty.137 Likewise, 
in Reader’s Digest, the supreme court oscilla ted between an emphasis 
on the conflict of interest inherent in the buyback of the control 
group’s shares and the process failures of the board structures 
approving the buyback and recapitalization.138 By the time the court 
added that the RDA board acted “perhaps in good faith,”139 the court 
had elicited skepticism on precisely that point. 
These analyses of good faith are based on the oscillation between 
two preexisting doctrinal standards, care and loyalty. Neither 
traditional standard would have enabled the plaintiffs to prevail, but 
when spun together, the elements of each analysis make the board 
appear to have done something sufficiently blameworthy to rule in 
the plaintiffs’ favor. Such tactics have a rich rhetorical history, 
recalling the optical illusion produced by the thaumatrope.140 As 
described by Professor Leon Lipson, “a Thaumatrope is a device in 
which two objects are painted on opposite sides of a card—for 
example, a man and a horse or a bird and a cage—and the card is 
fitted into a frame with a handle. When the handle is rotated rapidly, 
the onlooker sees the two objects combined into a single picture—the 
man on the horse’s back or the bird in the cage.”141 Following 
Professor Lipson,142 the analogy of a thaumatrope is most often used 
                                                 
 135. Disney, 825 A.2d at 289–90. 
 136. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, C.A. 
No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *33–*35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004). 
 137. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 138. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 139. Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. 466, 2002 Del. LEXIS 
488, at *6 (Del. Aug. 13, 2002). 
 140. Lipson borrowed the metaphor from the philosophical work of Richard Whately. See 
Lipson, supra note 14, at 11 (quoting Whately’s description of the thaumatrope). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Professor Lipson used the thaumatrope to criticize the legal reasoning in the Allegheny 
College opinion, in which Judge Cardozo oscillated between the principles of contract and 
promissory estoppel to provide relief for the college: 
Now what were the objects painted on the opposite sides of Judge Cardozo’s 
Thaumatrope? His trouble was that on the consideration side he had a solid rule but 
shaky facts; on the promissory -estoppel side he had a shaky rule but (potentially) 
solid facts. He twirled the Thaumatrope in order to give the impression that he had 
solid facts fitting a solid rule. Some lawyers think that what emerges instead is a 
picture of a bird on the horse’s back. 
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by commentators to describe, and often to critique, the opinions of 
Judge Cardozo.143 Here I wish to argue that the emerging 
jurisprudence of good faith operates as a tha umatrope, but I do not 
wish to import the implicit critique. 
The Disney opinion clearly resembles a thaumatrope. On one 
side of the card, Chancellor Chandler emphasized facts raising issues 
under the duty of loyalty and, on the other, facts raising issues under 
the duty of care. When he spun the card, the thaumatrope produced 
an image of a very bad board of directors, which the chancellor found 
may well have violated their duty of good faith. Elkins and Reader’s 
Digest work in the same way. The image of good faith produced by 
these cases is not a new and distinct doctrinal pillar. It is, instead, the 
middle space between the twin doctrines of care and loyalty. 
The suggestion that good faith operates as a rhetorical device 
oscillating between two substantive doctrinal principles, neither of 
which alone would result in liability, opens courts to a charge of 
unprincipled decisionmaking. Take a losing claim under both loyalty 
and care, the objection goes, mix the rhetoric of both principles, and 
suddenly you’ve got a winning claim? Thaumatrope analytics, 
however, only appear unprincipled if the two doctrinal categories 
between which the analysis oscillates are viewed as rigidly formalistic 
and hermetically sealed. But care and loyalty, in fact, are not mutually 
exclusive. They can instead be described as what Professor Jack 
Balkin has referred to as “nested oppositions”—that is, opposed 
concepts that also have “a relation of dependence, similarity, or 
containment.”144 
1. Nested Oppositions, Co-Constitutive Categories, and Two-
Fers. Doctrinal categorizations and other decisionmaking heuristics 
tend to be built on conceptual oppositions.145 Conceptual oppositions 
                                                                                                                
Id. 
 143. See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., Thaumatrope, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1319, 1320–21 (1999) 
(reviewing ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998)) (quoting Professor Lipson’s metaphor of 
the thaumatrope to describe a common criticism of Judge Cardozo’s opinions); Dan Simon, The 
Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 
1038 n.44 (2000) (observing that the thaumatrope metaphor is often used to critique Judge 
Cardozo’s opinions); Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s Allegheny College Opinion: A Case Study in 
Law as an Art, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1103, 1147 (1996) (asserting that Lipson’s use of the 
thaumatrope metaphor to describe Cardozo’s Allegheny College opinion is inaccurate). 
 144. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (book review). 
 145. See, for example, Professor Paul’s discussion of the “two-fer,” infra note 158 and 
accompanying text. 
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are established by opposing two terms in a particular context. The 
context of the opposition is crucial because the concepts are not 
logically related—and therefore not contradictory—except in a 
specific context.146 Balkin illustrates the importance of context with 
the colors red and green: 
If we say that red and green are opposite colors in a traffic light, we 
are not saying that they logically contradict each other. Rather, they 
are opposed with respect to the meanings these colors are given in 
traffic signals. The context of conventions concerning traffic signals 
makes them opposites. In another context, they may be seen as 
similar to each other. For example, red and green are both colors of 
the natural spectrum, or colors associated with Christmas, while 
lavender and brown are not. Thus red and green are seen as 
different in some contexts, and are seen as having similar properties 
in others.147 
A nested opposition is a conceptual opposition each of whose terms 
contains the other, whether through similarity to the opposite, 
overlap, or a relation of historical dependence or transformation.148 
Recognizing nested oppositions allows ossified categories to be 
deconstructed and reconstructed in ways that emphasize similarities 
as well as differences,149 revealing “similarities where before we saw 
only differences, or historical or conceptual dependence where before 
we saw only differentiation.”150 
Nested oppositions appear throughout legal doctrine. Balkin 
gives the example of negligence and strict liability, which appear as 
alternate liability rules, growing out of opposed principles—fault and 
compensation.151 Balkin, however, shows that many of the subrules 
and standards of each rule implicate questions ordinarily raised under 
its opposite.152 For example, negligence doctrine includes bright-line 
rules that determine liability without regard to fault, whereas strict 
                                                 
 146. See Balkin, supra  note 144, at 1674–75 (explaining that the distinction between logical 
contradiction and conceptual opposition, the latter of which depends upon context whereas the 
former does not, is occasionally overlooked); see, e.g., T.K. SEUNG, STRUCTURALISM AND 
HERMENEUTICS 12–17 (1982) (providing examples to distinguish logical contradictions and 
conceptual oppositions). 
 147. Balkin, supra note 144, at 1674. 
 148. Id. at 1676. 
 149. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory , 96 YALE L.J. 743, 744 
(1987) (describing applications of deconstructive techniques to legal reasoning). 
 150. Balkin, supra note 144, at 1676. 
 151. Id. at 1683. 
 152. Id. at 1683–84. 
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liability doctrine returns to fault issues in analyzing causation along 
the lines of foreseeability.153 Similarly, in constitutional law, Professor 
Julie Nice has found a “third strand” of equal protection 
jurisprudence that applies the logic of thaumatrope analytics on the 
basis of nested oppositions, or what she refers to as “co-constitutive 
categories.”154 Her survey of recent Supreme Court interpretations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides numerous examples in which 
the court goes beyond the formalistic doctrinal categories of 
fundamental rights and suspect classifications by focusing on the 
relationship between the rights and the class.155 According to Nice, 
the co-constitutive relationship between fundamental rights and 
suspect classes explains the Supreme Court’s oscillation between the 
two traditional categories and the resulting creation of a third analytic 
category between them: 
The third strand of equal protection analysis recognizes that rights 
and classes are mutually constitutive in that rights are partially 
marked, defined, and constructed by the classes who do and do not 
hold them, just as rights partially mark, define and construct those 
classes. . . . The third strand recognizes the interdependence, rather 
than separation and isolation, of rights and the classes of right-
holders and non-right-holders.156 
Nice develops this analysis of equal protection jurisprudence by 
integrating the two traditional lines of analysis and inquiring into the 
ways in which each category contains elements that “mark[], define[], 
and construct[] the meaning” of the other.157 
                                                 
 153. Id.; see also J.M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1, 4–13 (1986) (describing oppositions in legal rule choices). 
 154. See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1421 (2000) [hereinafter Nice, Antinomies]; Julie A. Nice, 
The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive 
Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (1999) [hereinafter Nice, Third 
Strand]. 
 155. See Nice, Antinomies, supra  note 154, at 1392 (stating that “co-constitutive theory 
explores both how law shapes society and how society shapes law”); Nice, Third Strand, supra 
note 154, at 1215 (defining the co-constitutive thesis with respect to equal protection to mean 
“both that rights construct the classes of people who hold (and do not hold) them and that the 
status and conduct of these classes construct the meaning of rights. Because rights and classes 
are mutually constitutive, the Court can plausibly integrate its consideration of them”). 
 156. Nice, Third Strand, supra note 154, at 1223–24. 
 157. Id. at 1225. Professor Nice states the analysis more broadly as follows: 
I suggest that co-constitutive theory offers an approach for disrupting and 
transcending the antinomies. Put simply, co-constitutive theory suggests that the 
antinomic alternatives are not mutually exclusive, contradictory, or even 
dichotomous. At a minimum, then, the choices posed are unnecessary ones. 
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The basic intuition underlying “nested oppositions” and “co-
constitutive categories” has been explained with elegant simplicity by 
my colleague Professor Jeremy Paul. Using the more modest 
terminology of a “Two-Fer,” Paul argues that such analytic 
techniques are pervasive throughout the law as well as in everyday 
reasoning.158 In his words: 
Suppose you were on a diet and had two rules for yourself. One rule 
was that you would allow yourself a small dessert after dinner if you 
had skipped lunch on the same day. The other was that you would 
allow yourself dessert if you had run your typical four miles that day. 
It is 8 p.m. and that small bowl of frozen yogurt is quite tempting. 
You reflect back on your day and recall that you had a dry bagel, 
nothing on it, and black coffee at noontime. You also cut your run 
short after 3 ½ miles. May you indulge?159 
Paul’s answer, thankfully perhaps, is that you may. His reasoning, 
similar to Balkin’s nested oppositions and Nice’s account of co-
constitutive categories, is that “the reason behind both the no-lunch 
rule and the four mile requirement is the same.”160 Where the 
background rationale for both rules is the same and the dieter has 
come close, but not quite succeeded, under each rule, the background 
rationale may have been satisfied without formalistically satisfying 
either rule. Have the yogurt, Paul says, because you have satisfied the 
reason behind the rules even if you have not fully satisfied either of 
the two rules individually.161 
If a mode of analysis that oscillates between two conceptual 
categories—what I have called “thaumatrope analytics”—can be 
defended when the concepts have a relation of similarity, overlap, or 
historical dependence, the question remains whether there is such a 
relationship between the duties of care and loyalty. Are there hidden 
                                                                                                                
Moreover, the choices posed are harmful because eventually they impair our ability 
to understand more comprehensively the complex interactions, including the 
simultaneous, ongoing, and mutual constitution of law and society. 
Nice, Antinomies, supra  note 154, at 1415–16. 
 158. Jeremy Paul, Changing the Subject: Cognitive Theory and the Teaching of Law , 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 987, 1011 (2002). 
 159. Id. at 1013–14. 
 160. Id. at 1014. 
 161. In Professor Paul’s words, “the combination of a light lunch and an almost full workout 
is quite likely to be a greater net contribution to weight loss than either one alone. Even though 
the rules crafted for the diet are separate, it would be rather stubborn to insist on keeping them 
that way.” Id. 
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similarities between the two traditional fiduciary duties? Do they 
overlap? Are thaumatrope analytics appropriately applied to them? 
2. Care as Loyalty and Loyalty as Care.  At first glance, the 
duties of care and loyalty appear quite distinctive. The basic concern 
under the duty of care is prudence, whereas under the duty of loyalty 
it is fidelity.162 The question of prudence depends upon whether the 
directors have conducted themselves in the management of the 
corporation as ordinary persons would in the management of their 
own affairs.163 The issue of fidelity, by contrast, involves whether the 
directors have put their own interests ahead of corporate interests 
and is generally answered by pointing to an unmitigated conflict of 
interest.164 These appear as different questions with distinctive lines of 
inquiry. 
A bit of digging beneath these surface differences, however, 
reveals the richly interconnected roots of the two doctrinal 
paradigms.165 Start with the duty of care: directors must conduct 
themselves as ordinarily prudent persons managing their own affairs. 
So far so good, but a moment’s reflection reveals that an ordinarily 
prudent person becomes an ordinarily prudent director only once an 
element of loyalty is assumed. How do ordinarily prudent directors 
conduct their affairs? A decision is taken with due care when, from an 
array of alternatives,166 the directors employ a procedure to pick the 
one that best advances the interests of the corporation.167 Now pause 
for a moment to consider what a funny way this is of conceiving what 
an ordinarily prudent persons would do in the conduct of their own 
affairs. One might typically assume that an ordinarily prudent person, 
in evaluating a set of alternatives, picks the one that provides the 
most personal benefit and the least personal cost. A director’s 
decisionmaking process, however, can be evaluated only by changing 
the referent from the individual director to the corporation. The 
question of prudence, in other words, is framed with a tacit element 
                                                 
 162. See supra Part I.A. 
 163. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 45–47 (linking care and loyalty on a philosophical basis 
that is different from, but consistent with, the account in this Part). 
 166. Delaware law assumes, first and foremost, that directors investigate the terms of a 
potential transaction and that they act “in a deliberate and knowledgeable way in identifying 
and exploring alternatives.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 
(Del. 1989). 
 167. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, § 8.30(a) (2004). 
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of loyalty. The question is not, even when one looks only to the 
decisionmaking process, whether it was designed to maximize the 
benefit to the individual director (or to the director’s family or alma 
mater or some other noncorporate constituency), but rather whether 
it was designed to maximize the benefit to the  corporation. Until the 
corporation is substituted for the individual, it is not possible even to 
ask whether the director has followed a reasonable process in making 
the decision.168 The process can only be evaluated once its purpose is 
understood. The directors must design their decisionmaking process 
to benefit the corporation, not themselves, but taking this as the goal 
of the process founds the duty-of-care analysis on an element of the 
duty of loyalty. 
The proximity of the duty of care to the duty of loyalty has 
prompted several observers to note that in those rare situations in 
which courts have imposed liability under the duty of care, there is 
often a sub rosa element of loyalty at stake in the transaction.169 
Recognizing this overlap between care and loyalty, an eminent 
commentator argues: 
Not infrequently, the facts [in a duty-of-care case] suggest that the 
directors were actually being sued and held liable because of 
wrongful self-interested conduct—for a violation of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty—and the courts’ talk about duty of care is simply a 
way of letting the plaintiffs win without having to prove all the 
elements of a wrongful conflict of interest transaction.170 
The duty of care, in other words, contains within itself an assumption 
that the decisionmaker is motivated by the corporation’s business 
                                                 
 168. The information gathered to make a decision to benefit oneself is different from the 
information gathered for a decision to benefit someone or something else. With different 
objectives, one asks different sorts of questions. For example, a person designing a transaction 
to maximize benefits to herself might care about individual income tax consequences, while 
someone designing a transaction to maximize benefits to the corporation will care only about 
the corporate level consequences. 
 169. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 20, at 1290 (“ Where courts encountered 
troubling instances of director action in cases where the directors had no apparent conflict of 
interest, the courts were inclined to ask loyalty-based questions, such as whether the action 
constituted a fraud or a ‘constructive fraud’ against the corporation or its minority 
shareholders.” (citation omitted)); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New 
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1100 
(1968) (discussing a case that is apparently a duty-of-care case but noting that “the facts are 
heavy with the odor of self-dealing”). 
 170. CLARK, supra note 21, at 126. 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
42 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1 
purpose.171 This tacit subordination of self-interest to corporate 
interest is generally discussed under the duty of loyalty but without it 
analyses under the duty of care do not make sense. 
Now come to the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty turns on the 
problem of conflict between directors’ personal and fiduciary 
interests. This includes situations in which the directors, rather than 
maximizing corporate wealth, divert corporate cash flows or 
investment opportunities to themselves, lavish corporate assets and 
perquisites on themselves, and cause the corporation to take action to 
protect their positions or reputations.172 None of these transactions 
would raise an eyebrow if they were entered into at arm’s length with 
a third party. The basic problem is that the transaction is not at arm’s 
length and involves, in some way, directors self-dealing through the 
corporations they control. The intuition that identifies this as an 
obvious problem is that the corporation, that collection of wealth 
belonging to people other than the director, is likely to get a raw deal 
in this kind of bargain. To protect these other people from getting a 
bad deal, the law proscribes transactions of this type or, at the very 
least, permits directors to enter into them only after satisfying 
procedural safeguards.173 
Step back for a moment. Worry about the directors’ loyalty arises 
from concern that their disloyalty will result in a poor bargain for the 
corporation. The concern, in other words, is that conflicted directors 
will strike bargains for the corporation that ordinarily prudent 
persons would not strike for themselves. This can be seen most clearly 
if the non-arm’s-length transactions that raise duty-of-loyalty 
concerns are imagined as arm’s-length transactions with third parties. 
Would an ordinarily prudent person lease a corporate asset to a third 
party on exceedingly generous terms?174 Would an ordinarily prudent 
person lavish compensation on a third party and permit the third 
                                                 
 171. See generally  E. Norman Veasey, Duty of Loyalty: The Criticality of the Counselor’s 
Role, 45 BUS. LAW. 2065, 2071–72 (1990) (stating that “even if the business judgment rule is 
applicable  . . . a directorial decision cannot be allowed to stand if it . . . ‘cannot be attributed to 
any rational business purpose’” (quoting In re J. P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 
780–81 n.5 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
 172. See CLARK, supra  note 21, at 14 (describing four paradigmatic conflict-of-interest 
patterns,  including basic self-dealing, executive compensation, the taking of corporate or 
shareholder property, and corporate action with mixed motives). 
 173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768–69 (2d Cir. 1980) (self-dealing in 
leasing of property). 
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party to usurp investment opportunities?175 These are duty-of-loyalty 
concerns framed as duty-of-care questions. The phrasing is natural 
because, at its core, the duty of loyalty is just a bet that some 
situations are likely to lead to careless or imprudent transactions for 
the corporation, which is to say that the duty of care is a motivating 
concern for the duty of loyalty. Here again the duties overlap. 
Taking this view of the fundamental question of corporate law 
shows that the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are indeed nested 
oppositions. They are co-constitutive. Their meanings overlap as both 
seek to answer the fundamental question of whether a particular 
decision or a particular transaction is likely to be beneficial to the 
corporation. Whether the question is confronted from the perspective 
of the duty of care or of the duty of loyalty is just a difference in 
approach. To put it another way, the fundamental question 
underlying both duties really is good faith. Are the directors doing 
their best in acting for someone else? Arguably, that is the only 
question in all of corporate law.176 It is simply asked in different ways 
in different contexts.177 
Because both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty get at the 
same fundamental question, it is possible that there will be situations 
in which one can answer the fundamental question without checking 
all of the boxes for liability under either analytic standard. This is the 
key to the thaumatrope. The sides of the disk might be different, but 
spinning it reveals a relationship between the two sides. So the picture 
becomes a man atop a horse or a bird in a cage. 
                                                 
 175. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) (corporate 
opportunities). 
 176. This view has been attributed to Samuel Arsht, a leader in the Delaware bar, who is 
said to have proposed that the Delaware law be simplified to the following principle: “Directors 
of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as long as 
they act in good faith.” See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate 
Law Work? , 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (characterizing the statement as “a completely 
accurate description of Delaware fiduciary duty law”). 
 177. One might argue that the traditional rubrics of care and loyalty had become 
exceedingly rule-like and rigid and that the good faith thaumatrope merely restores the law to a 
flexible fiduciary standard that asks the essential question: Are the directors acting to advance 
corporate welfare? It  is, after all, a fair assumption that Chancellor Chandler would not have 
resorted to good faith if the interplay of the business judgment rule and Disney’s 102(b)(7) 
provision had left room for liability under the duty of care or if the formal independence of the 
board and Eisner’s lack of formal control or domination had left room for liability under the 
duty of loyalty. Consider, on this point, Professor Roe’s observation that “[h]ad Van Gorkom 
survived, one wonders whether boards like Enron’s and WorldCom’s would have been more 
alert.” Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 633 n.183 (2003).  
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B. Crisis as Context 
Although the good faith thaumatrope may be viewed as a 
coherent approach to problems at the intersection of conceptually 
overlapping doctrinal categories, it is an analytic technique that 
changes the law of fiduciary duty. The duties of care and loyalty have 
traditionally been viewed as distinct, with separate doctrinal 
requirements. Now, however, the good faith thaumatrope suggests 
that there are situations in which the categories may be blended, 
allowing claims to survive when some but not all of the traditional 
doctrinal requirements have been met. This blending of substantive 
issues fundamentally loosens the doctrinal constraints on the 
judiciary. Looser doctrinal requirements enable judges to intervene 
more easily in corporate decisionmaking. In other words, by blending 
the duties of care and loyalty and removing the need to completely 
satisfy either traditional standard, the good faith thaumatrope moves 
the frontier on the spectrum of authority and accountability away 
from board authority and toward judicial accountability. 
Seeing the change in this way, one can ask why and, more 
specifically, why now? The duties of care and loyalty, after all, have 
long been a part of corporate law. Why then are courts only now 
recognizing their interrelationship and bringing good faith forward to 
fill the gap? And, now that they have done so, is there not a risk that 
the mixing of the traditional standards will overwhelm the distinctions 
between them and that the longstanding requirements of each will be 
abandoned in favor of more flexible thaumatrope analytics? More 
simply, what caused good faith, as I have described it, to appear only 
now? And what will prevent good faith from overwhelming the 
traditional doctrines of care and loyalty? The answer to all of these 
questions lies, I believe, in the interpretive context of the good faith 
cases. 
The context of the good faith cases was corporate scandal and 
economic downturn.178 In the wake of the accounting debacles at 
                                                 
 178. See Ronald Alsop, Reputations of Big Companies Tumble in Consumer Survey, WALL. 
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2004, at B1 (reporting on results of a Harris Interactive/ Reputation Institute poll 
finding that 75 percent of respondents felt that the image of large corporations was either “not 
good” or “terrible”); Julie Rawe, Heroes to Heels, TIME, June 17, 2002, at 48 (outlining 
improprieties at Tyco, Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia and describing the contribution of 
these activities to an environment of scandal and distrust). On the coincidence of scandal with 
economic downturns in provoking reform, see Gregory Mark, The Legal History of Corporate 
Scandal: Some Observations on the Ancestry and Significance of the Enron Era , 35 CONN. L. 
REV. 1073, 1083 (2003) (“As long as corporate managers make us money we not only overlook 
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Enron and WorldCom,179 the looting of Tyco and Adelphia,180 the 
allegations of celebrity insider trading,181 and revelations of conflict of 
interest in analyst recommendations,182 the American corporate 
governance system was thrown into stark relief.183 Law reviews hosted 
symposia on reforming American corporate governance184 and 
published an unprecedented number of articles on corporate law.185 
                                                                                                                
practices that are a bit edgy, but we also make excuses for them and in many cases celebrate the 
genius that gave rise to the practices. But when the market goes down, the dark side emerges 
and so does public outrage—it is the loss of money that triggers the outrage, not the practices 
themselves.”). 
 179. See generally William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of 
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275 (2002) (analyzing both the immediate and root causes of the accounting fraud and 
resulting collapse at Enron); Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The 
Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C1 (describing the fraud and collapse at Worldcom). 
 180. See generally  Peter Grant & Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder and One Son Are 
Found Guilty , WALL ST. J., July 9, 2004, at A1 (reporting developments in the criminal trials of 
Adelphia executives accused of corporate looting); Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Former 
Tyco Executives Are Charged: New York Prosecutors Say Ex-CEO, Finance Officer Ran 
“Criminal Enterprise,” WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at A3 (describing allegations that the former 
CEO and CFO stole more than $170 million from the company, engaged in illegal stock sales 
and committed accounting fraud to cover up their activities). 
 181. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Being Martha Stewart—Will Her Celebrity Status End Up 
Doing Her In? , CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2002, at A25 (arguing that publicly disclosed facts did not 
support a charge of insider trading); Matthew Rose & Kara Scannell, Executives on Trial: 
Lawyers for Stewart, Bacanovic Vow to Appeal, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A1 (describing the 
conviction of Martha Stewart on obstruction of justice charged in connection with the 
government’s investigation of her insider trading). 
 182. See generally Ann Davis & Susanne Craig, Analyze This: Research Is Fuzzier Than 
Ever, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at C1 (describing and critiquing the outcome of investigations 
into investment analyst conflicts of interest). 
 183. In a speech before the National Press Club, Henry Paulson, Chairman and CEO of 
Goldman Sachs, stated: 
In my lifetime, American business has never been under such scrutiny. To be blunt, 
much of it is deserved . . . . [T]he Enron debacle and subsequent revelations have 
revealed major shortcomings in the way some U.S. companies and those charged with 
their oversight have gone about their business. And it has, without doubt, eroded 
public trust. 
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Chairman & CEO, Goldman Sachs, Address at the National Press Club, 
Restoring Investor Confidence: An Agenda for Change (June 5, 2002) available at http:// 
www.gs.com/our_firm/media_center/docs/restoring -investor-confidence.pdf. 
 184. See, for example, Symposium: Enron and its Aftermath, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671 
(2002); Symposium: Enron: Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN. J.L.  BUS. & FIN. 1 (2002); 
Symposium: Lessons From Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 989 (2003); Symposium: On Enron, Worldcom, and Their Aftermath, 27 VT. L. REV. 817 
(2003); Symposium: Securities Regulation and Corporate Responsibility, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 
211 (2003); Symposium: Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics 
Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
 185. According to statistics kept by the Corporate Practice Commentator, in 1999 there 
were 235 articles published on corporate law (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles  
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Legal academics testified in Washington.186 Editorials and features on 
corporate reforms began to appear regularly in the Wall Street 
Journal.187 As a result, principles that had long formed the 
background context of corporate governance and corporate law 
adjudication were suddenly pushed into the foreground and sharply 
contested, ultimately leading to a presidential promise,188 federal 
legislation,189 and a host of administrative and other rulemaking 
proposals.190 
                                                                                                                
of 1999 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/thompson/1999best.htm (last updated May 23, 
2003)), 250 in 2000, (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles of 2000 (2003), http:// 
law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/thompson/2000best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), then 300 in 
2001, (The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles of 2001 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/ 
faculty/thompson/2001best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), 350 in 2002, (The Top 10 
Corporate and Securities Articles of 2002 (2003), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/ 
thompson/2002best.htm (last updated May 25, 2003)), and more than 425 articles in 2003 and 
2004, (E-mail from Robert Thompson, Editor, Corporate Practice Commentator, to author 
(May 21, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)). 
 186. See, e.g., Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Auditors and Analysts: An Analysis of the 
Evidence and Reform Proposals in Light of the Enron Experience (U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, March 5, 2002); Testimony of Frank Partnoy, Enron and 
the Derivatives World (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jan. 24, 2002); 
Testimony of John H. Langbein, What’s Wrong With Employer Stock Pension Plans (U.S. 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jan. 24, 2002). This testimony is collected in 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 145, 169, 487 (Nancy B. Rapaport 
and Bala G. Dharan, eds., 2004). 
 187. See, e.g., Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2004, at A16; John Thain, Editorial, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too 
High, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2004, at A20; G. Bennett Stewart III, Editorial, Debating Sa rbanes-
Oxley: Why Smart Managers Do Dumb Things, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003, at A16; Stan O’Neal, 
Editorial, Risky Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2003, at A16; Max Baucus, et al., A Second 
Betrayal, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at A12; Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, The SEC’s 
Repair Job, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A14. 
 188. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Corporate 
Responsibility (July 9, 2002), at 4, available at 2002 WL 1461845 (detailing the president’s ten-
point Accountability Plan for American Business). 
 189. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. Law No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended at §§ 7201–02, 7211–19, 7231–34, 7241–46, 7261–66, 78o-6, 78d-3, 1519–20, 1514A, 
1348–1350 (2003)). 
 190. The flurry of SEC rulemaking in the wake of the corporate scandals can be seen in the 
Commission’s online archives of proposed rules and comments. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
PROPOSED RULES AND COMMENTS, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml  
(last visited May 19, 2005). Other standards-setting and self-regulatory bodies have also been 
making rule changes, often at the urging of the SEC. See, e.g., PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING 
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2004),  
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf; Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NASD and NYSE, 
67 Fed. Reg. 34,968-01 (May 15, 2002) (approving new NASD and NYSE regulations). 
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I cite this chapter in our recent history not to argue that these 
reforms were right or wrong, good or bad, but to illustrate the 
emergence of a national debate about corporate governance issues. 
As a result of the debate that started in late 2001, Delaware’s basic 
policy choice—a robust vision of the business judgment rule and 
maximum respect for the principle of board authority—was suddenly 
less tenable. As the question of board deference versus judicial (or 
administrative) accountability moved from the background to the 
foreground of the public agenda, decisionmakers who hewed to older, 
now openly contested discourses were threatened with serious 
rhetorical consequences. The rote application of the business 
judgment rule could make a judicial body appear lax and 
unresponsive to the national debate or, worse, beholden to 
managerial interests. 
As evidence that this turmoil was felt by the Delaware judiciary, 
consider two addresses, later published as law review articles, by 
Chief Justice Veasey. In an address given at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School on December 8, 2000 and published in the 
school’s law review in June 2001, Veasey emphasized the principle of 
judicial nonintervention in board decisionmaking.191 He drew upon 
his court’s opinion in Brehm to illustrate a situation in which the court 
would not find liability despite its disapproval of the firm’s corporate 
governance practices.192 Veasey further described how the Council of 
Institutional Investors lobbied the court to define and adopt a 
standard of director independence.193 In spite of finding aspects of the 
proposal “interesting,” Veasey argued that the court had to refuse the 
Council’s request because “it is not the province of the courts to 
‘legislate’ or otherwise impose such rules.”194 Corporate governance 
standards would not be incorporated into the law of fiduciary duty on 
the view that “[c]odes of best practices or corporate bylaws . . . not 
judicial fiat . . . are the appropriate intracorporate vehicle to establish 
                                                 
 191. E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate 
Governance Practices—Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (2001). Chief Justice Veasey 
repeated the principle of judicial nonintervention several times. See, e.g., id. at 2179–80 (“The 
private ordering aspect of [judge-made law] must provide ex ante the contractual stockholder 
protections deemed important, as distinct from ex post judicial rewriting of the contractual 
framework.”); id. at 2180 (“[C]ourts should be reluctant to interfere with business decisions and 
should not create surprises or wild doctrinal swings in their expectations of directorial 
behavior.”); id. at 2181 (“Courts do not reach out to monitor boards or to resolve disputes.”). 
 192. Id. at 2182. 
 193. Id. at 2182–83. 
 194. Id. at 2183. 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
48 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1 
this type of protocol.”195 Veasey went on to describe what he saw as 
good corporate governance practices, but emphasized repeatedly that 
these were aspirational ideals to be decided upon by individual 
boards, not legal mandates of the court.196 
Now fast forward two years to an address given by the same 
justice at the University of Iowa Law School on March 6, 2003 and 
printed in the Journal of Corporation Law that spring.197 In this 
postscandal address, Chief Justice Veasey’s tone was considerably 
more cautionary, emphasizing the responsibilities of directors rather 
than the restraints on the judiciary, pointing out that “directors must 
be careful and work hard to understand the facts behind that which 
they are deciding,”198 and underscoring that the lack of a bright-line 
rule about excessive compensation “does not mean there are no 
limits.”199 The Disney litigation was again mentioned as an example, 
but this time it was the 2003 chancery court decision, cited with 
approval and used to illustrate how directors may sometimes go too 
far.200 Good faith, Veasey then suggested, might be usefully employed 
as a doctrinal hook to incorporate the emerging consensus on best 
corporate governance practices.201 Stating first that “the utter failure 
to follow the minimum expectations of the evolving standards of 
director conduct, the minimum expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley, or 
the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules . . . might . . . raise a good faith 
issue,”202 Veasey later repeated that “it is arguable —but not settled—
that the issue of good faith may be measured . . . against the backdrop 
of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SRO requirements.”203 The differences 
between the two addresses could hardly be more pronounced. In the 
winter of 2000–2001, the chief justice lectured on judicial restraint, 
                                                 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 2188–91. Veasey emphasized: “These are recommended protocols offered as an 
aspirational matter only. They do not necessarily drive liability considerations, and they do not 
portend how a case will be decided.” Id. at 2190. After his list of corporate governance 
suggestions, he emphasized again: “these suggestions are purely aspirational and not necessarily 
liability-related.” Id. at 2191. 
 197. Veasey, supra note 111. 
 198. Id. at 445. 
 199. Id. at 447. In the next breath, he suggested that there may be greater space to review 
compensation matters: “Judicial review of these kinds of director decisions is not about dollar 
amounts in isolation.” Id. 
 200. Id. at 447. 
 201. Id. at 446–48. 
 202. Id. at 446. 
 203. Id. at 448. SROs or “self-regulatory organizations” refer to the stock exchanges, 
including the NYSE, and national securities associations, such as the NASD. 
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nonintervention in corporate affairs, and the difference between 
corporate governance aspirations and corporate law standards. In the 
spring of 2003, however, he lectured on director responsibilities, 
available avenues of judicial review of certain board decisions, and 
the incorporation of corporate governance standards into corporate 
law fiduciary duties. On the last point, the two lectures could not be 
more different. Prior to the scandals, Chief Justice Veasey sought to 
delineate a hard boundary between corporate governance and 
corporate law. After the scandals, the chief justice offered a 
conception of good faith that could import “best practices” in 
corporate governance into the substantive standards of fiduciary duty. 
The very issues advocated by the Council of Institutional Investors 
and other would-be “change entrepreneurs” without much success 
prior to the corporate crises of late 2001 and 2002 were suddenly 
taken much more seriously after events pushed them into the 
foreground and made them the subject of public debate.204 Veasey’s 
two lectures straddle this shift in the interpretive context of corporate 
law. The difference in tone and content between them illustrates 
judicial responsiveness to changes in the interpretive context and 
Delaware’s sensitivity to federal preemption, a concern Veasey 
candidly admitted after leaving the bench.205 
As further evidence of the responsiveness of the judiciary to 
shifts in the corporate law discourse, consider another postscandal 
article by two sitting members of the chancery court, Chancellor 
Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine, that addressed the shift in 
                                                 
 204. See generally  Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (describing the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as the result of political tumult when “policy entrepreneurs” were suddenly 
influential). For a discussion of “change entrepreneurs” and their role in changing the law, see 
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory , 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1805, 1807 (1997) (describing both Catherine MacKinnon and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes as “change entrepreneurs”). In the corporate law context, academic 
commentators have occasionally served as would-be change entrepreneurs in disparaging the 
role of Delaware and arguing for federalization of corporate law. Most famously, Professor Cary 
characterized Delaware as a destructive “pygmy” in calling for federal incorporation. William L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974) 
(arguing for an “escape from the present predicament in which a pygmy among the 50 states 
prescribes, interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy”). 
 205. E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 
163, 163 (2004) (“[V]igilance is needed because Delaware’s corporate preeminence is more 
vulnerable to a pervasive federal encroachment now than it was before [the scandals].”). 
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interpretive context.206 Expressly recognizing the “tumult” in 
American corporate governance,207 Chandler and Strine described the 
post-Enron reforms undertaken by the federal government as “a 
relatively aggressive move by the federal government and the 
Exchanges into the realm of board decision making and composition, 
an area where, traditionally, the states have been predominant.”208 
The encroachment of highly specific federal rules on what had been 
more flexible, “principles-based” state law,209 Strine and Chandler 
argue, may be due in part to the failure of Delaware law to respond 
with sufficient speed to changes in business practices, specifically 
questions of executive compensation: 
[I]t can be argued fairly that Delaware’s common law did not react 
quickly or aggressively enough to changes in compensation practices 
during the last two decades, changes that were so substantial 
quantitatively that they required a qualitatively more intense form 
of judicial review, through, for example, a reinvigorated application 
of the concept of waste. In the past, the Delaware courts had 
generally taken a hands-off approach to executive compensation 
based on the assumption that this was a matter of business 
judgment, which could also be factored into the electorate’s voting 
decisions.210 
The authors then suggested that states’ inattentiveness to corporate 
governance problems could be corrected through greater sensitivity 
going forward: 
The 2002 Reforms contain measures reflecting a policy judgment 
that the constraints of state law on executive compensation are, in 
                                                 
 206. William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 
U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003). 
 207. This description appears in the first sentence of the article. Id. at 953. 
 208. Id. at 959. Later the authors repeat the charge, arguing that: 
The most striking feature of the 2002 Reforms is a pervasive and general one: the 
extent to which they can be seen as a shadow corporation law that requires public 
company boards to comply with a very specific set of procedural prescriptions. This 
aspect of the Reforms represents a departure from the general spheres in which the 
three principle sources of corporate governance in the American sy stem have 
operated. 
Id. at 973 (footnotes omitted).  
 209. Id. at 979 (“From the perspective of Delaware . . . the 2002 Reforms are somewhat 
problematic because they supplement our principles-based, substantive corporation laws with a 
variety of specific requirements that are not part of any overall system of corporate 
governance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 210. Id. at 1001. 
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themselves, inadequate to protect investors against abusive 
compensation practices. State law policymakers—including judges 
shaping the common law—will undoubtedly be responsive to this 
expression of concern and may use it as an opportunity to reflect 
more deeply on whether their own policies need adaptation to better 
protect stockholders.211 
Strine and Chandler are thus offering a prescription on how states can 
avoid further federal encroachment: state corporate law courts should 
interpret legal standards in ways that permit them to respond flexibly 
to shifts in the interpretive context of corporate law. 
The chancery court’s 2003 opinion in Disney can be read as an 
example of this prescription in action. The Disney litigation, like 
Chief Justice Veasey’s two speeches, spans the shift in corporate law 
discourse resulting from the arrival of the corporate governance crisis 
in 2001 and 2002. The deferential tone of the supreme court’s opinion 
in 2000 reflects the last days of the bull market of the late 1990s, when 
a promarket, antiregulatory approach ruled the day. With the decline 
of the market and the arrival of several highly public scandals the 
following year, the world (or at least as much of it as matters to 
corporate law policymakers) began to change. Public outrage 
emerged as a real constraint,212 and the threat of federal intervention 
in corporate governance reappeared.213 Policy mavens actively 
debated what ought to be done “to prevent future Enrons,”214 and 
people again began to discuss whether control of the nation’s 
corporate governance system ought to be wrested away from the tiny 
state of Delaware.215 The hitherto backgrounded discourse of 
                                                 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Lucien Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 786–88 (2002) (describing “outrage” as a cost 
of and constraint on high executive compensation). Professor Roe has demonstrated that the 
force of “outrage” varies across cultures and therefore exerts a different quality of constraint in, 
for example, the United States and France. Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic 
Model of Corporate Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1256–62 (2002). I would add only that the 
force of outrage can vary within a single country at different cultural moments—for example, in 
times of calm and times of crisis. 
 213. Professor Roe explains the tendency of the federal government to regulate corporate 
governance in response to scandal by analogy to a paradigm from the political science literature. 
Congress regulates corporate governance with a fire alarm approach, rather than a policy patrol 
approach: “[T]he fire alarm is the scandal or bad economic performance.” Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2530 (2005). 
 214. Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18. 
 215. George Mellon, Editorial, Can Outside Directors Ride Herd on CEOs? , WALL ST. J., 
July 16, 2002, at A17 (describing “yet another effort building to federalize corporate law”). 
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authority versus accountability was brought into the foreground, and 
the rhetorical stakes of appearing lax or unresponsive were raised.216 
By the time it heard Disney again in 2003, the Delaware judiciary had 
internalized this shift in the corporate law discourse.217 More directly, 
Disney was a case about compensation, the area in which Chancellor 
Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine argued that Delaware had been 
least responsive,218 and an area that has recently generated significant 
attention and proposals for reform in the legal and financial 
literature.219 In this environment, the judiciary decided that it could 
no longer remain passive, and the good faith thaumatrope was born. 
The jurisprudence of good faith is not the only line of recent 
Delaware case law to interpret existing corporate law doctrine in a 
way that increases judicial flexibility and, therefore, board 
accountability to courts.220 Of all the postscandal decisions 
empowering the judiciary vis-à-vis boards, however, the emergence of 
good faith in Disney has the most far-reaching potential. By loosening 
the doctrinal standards of both care and loyalty to create a new 
avenue of judicial intervention in corporate governance, the good 
faith thaumatrope promises to increase the judicial scrutiny of board 
conduct. This raises the question, discussed in the next Part, of 
whether good faith will shift the business judgment rule and realign 
the balance of authority and accountability. 
                                                 
 216. It is worth noting that 2001–2002 is not the first time this has happened. Professor Roe 
has documented several instances, notably including the passage of the Federal Securities Laws 
in the 1930s, when the “populist and progressive goal of superseding lax state corporation laws 
with more stringent federal standards” was nearly realized. See Roe, supra note 177, at 602–04 
(describing various efforts to end Delaware’s primacy in corporate law). 
 217. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1202 
(2004) (arguing that extrajudicial pronouncements by Chief Justice Veasey and Vice Chancellor 
Strine signal that “Delaware judges are fully aware of corporate misconduct and its pernicious 
effects on our corporate law system, and that Delaware judges intend to creatively deploy their 
arsenal of doctrinal concepts to reinvigorate their assessment of corporate decision-makers”). 
 218. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 219. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra  note 99; Bebchuk et al., supra note 212. 
 220. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003) 
(rejecting the established change-of-control paradigm as applied to deal protection provisions); 
In re eBay, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 
2004) (applying the corporate opportunities doctrine to the practice of “spinning”—that is, the 
preferential allocation of hot IPO shares); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 
937–38 (Del. Ch. 2003) (loosening the traditional tests of director independence in the 
derivative suit context by accepting that noneconomic ties without any of the  traditional indicia 
of “domination and control” may draw a director’s independence into doubt). 
01_GRIFFITH .DOC  2/6/2006   4:00  PM 
2005] GOOD FAITH BUSINESS JUDGMENT 53 
III.  FLEXIBILITY AND CONSTRAINT:  
A THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW RHETORIC 
Whether doctrinal flexibility is good or bad for corporate law 
generally—a point on which there is ample debate221—it certainly 
empowers courts vis-à-vis boards. The real question for an analysis of 
                                                 
 221. Flexible law is indeterminate, which commentators argue imposes costs on the 
corporation while conferring benefits on corporate la wyers and the state of incorporation. See, 
e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering 
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 601–02 (2002) (summarizing the 
costs of indeterminacy arguments); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions 
When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 365, 367 (1992) (arguing that indeterminate sanctions overdeter); Douglas M. Branson, 
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 85, 108 (1990) (linking indeterminacy to the public choice account of corporate law); 
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2001) (arguing that indeterminacy enables Delaware to engage in 
price discrimination); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1946 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy makes it 
difficult for other states to copy the Delaware package); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 515 
(1987) (arguing that indeterminate corporate law favors the corporate bar); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of 
Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–7 (1999) (discussing the problem of overdeterrence in the 
context of uncertainty). On the other hand, flexible law may encourage innovative transactions 
and prevent well-counseled clients from evading the rationale behind the rule. See, e.g., Allen, 
supra note 27, at 898 (“[C]ertainty . . . creates the risk that . . . corporate management . . . might 
deploy such well-defined rules cleverly (and technically correctly), but with the purpose in mind 
not to advance long-term interests of investors, but to pursue some different purpose.”); Ian 
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1403–08 (1992) (book review) (analyzing the role of “muddy defaults” in 
triggering optimal bargains); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1095 (1995) (arguing that where 
each party has a probable claim in the entitlement, muddy defaults facilitate bargaining when 
parties cannot predict ex ante which of them will win in litigation); Tom Baker et al., The 
Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 446 (2004) 
(showing, through behavioral experimentation, that deterrence goals can be achieved by 
increasing uncertainty—i.e., volatility—without increasing expected sanctions); Jill E. Fisch, The 
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1061, 1081 (2000) (“Delaware’s indeterminate corporate law . . . induces negotiation and 
removes some incentives for strategic behavior. . . . Delaware’s lawmaking is uniquely 
structured to maximize responsiveness to changing business developments. Delaware reduces 
the potential for rent seeking in connection with the lawmaking process.”); Carol M. Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604 (1988) (describing the importance 
of oscillation between muddy and crystalline rules); Leo E. Strine, Delaware’s Corporate-Law 
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A 
Response to Kahn & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2001) (stating that “much of Delaware corporate law’s 
indeterminacy and litigation intensiveness is an unavoidable consequence of the flexibility of the 
Delaware Model, which leaves room for economically useful innovation and creativity”). It is 
tempting to conclude that this debate about flexibility and indeterminacy is itself indeterminate. 
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corporate law jurisprudence, however, is the relative freedom or 
constraint of the judiciary in using  that flexibility. If the judiciary is 
largely unconstrained by doctrine, is it also unconstrained in injecting 
itself into board decisionmaking? Or are there other sources of 
constraint, apart from corporate law doctrine, that limit the ability of 
the courts to realign the authority/accountability balance? If the 
flexibility of corporate law doctrine empowers judges, what weakens 
or threatens them? 
A. Judicial Power and Judicial Constraint 
The authority of corporate law judges in Delaware is contingent 
upon having jurisdiction—in the literal sense of speaking law—over 
the nation’s most important corporations. This jurisdiction is subject 
to two pervasive threats: corporate migration and federal preemption. 
If enough corporations leave Delaware, the law that Delaware judges 
speak will have fewer listeners, thus reducing the judiciary’s ability to 
make national corporate law. And if the federal government passes 
legislation or regulations moving corporate law, in whole or in part, 
into the federal sphere, the authority of the Delaware judiciary over 
those matters is effectively preempted.222 Building upon a classic 
political science model of judicial behavior, in which judges act to 
protect their authority,223 one might expect judges to respond to these 
pressures in the only way they know how—through the rhetoric of the 
judicial opinion. This forms the basis of a model of corporate law 
rhetoric. Rhetorical devices such as the good faith thaumatrope are 
designed to manage threats to judicial authority. This Section 
elaborates on these fundamental undercurrents of Delaware law, 
                                                 
 222. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (respecting  the internal 
affairs doctrine by denying the federal judiciary the authority to create and impose fiduciary 
duties inconsistent with state law, but noting that authority to override state corporate law rests 
with Congress). 
 223. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 2 (1964) (seminal 
study of judicial power “to shape, through the peculiar kinds of authority and discretion 
inherent in [the] office, the development of a particular public policy or set of public policies”). 
This is not to accuse judges of base motivations. Many judges may in fact believe that their 
rulings are on the whole beneficial to society. In protecting this benefit to society, then, the 
judge will also be motivated to maximize the scope of her rulings and protect the m from 
reversal—that is, to protect her own authority. Of course, judges may derive other benefits from 
their authority, including reputational rewards and, for Delaware corporate law judges, public 
regard as leading economic policymakers. But these motivations need not dominate the desire 
to do good, which the judiciary advances, at least in part, by protecting its own authority. See, 
e.g., Veasey, supra  note 205, at 163 (arguing that preserving the Delaware franchise is in the best 
interest of the general public). 
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focusing on the ways in which they shape (and are shaped by) 
corporate law rhetoric. 
Corporate migration—the possibility that corporations will leave 
Delaware for another state of incorporation—poses a direct threat to 
the state fisc. Incorporations and related taxes and fees are a 
significant source of revenue for the state of Delaware,224 the loss of 
which would have serious budgetary consequences for the state and 
equally serious political repercussions for its elected officials. Most 
obviously, Delaware legislators would be forced either to reduce 
spending or to increase taxation to make up for any shortfall from 
corporate migration, neither of which would be particularly popular 
with the electorate. It is therefore sensible to expect legislators, 
because they suffer the direct effects of corporate migration, to 
remain highly sensitive to corporate suggestions (and threats) that 
they may leave the state as a result of inhospitable law.225 However, 
because Delaware judges are appointed, not elected,226 and therefore 
not directly answerable to those whose taxes are increased or whose 
services are reduced, they may have less at stake. That the impact of 
corporate migration on the judiciary is indirect, however, does not 
mean that there is no impact. Judges are, after all, appointed by 
elected officials, who can be expected to screen candidates for their 
sensitivity to these issues at appointment and to retaliate at 
reappointment should a judge show himself or herself to be 
insensitive.227 More directly, the legislature has shown itself willing to 
                                                 
 224. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 690–92, 724–25 (2002) (detailing revenues that incorporations and 
related taxes and fees bring Delaware and arguing that Delaware exerts monopoly power in this 
market). 
 225. These threats may be made by corporate lobbies, such as the business roundtable or 
corporate advisors, often packaged as law firm memoranda to clients. For example, the 
preeminent law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz circulated several such memoranda at 
the height of the takeover controversy, threatening to “leav[e] Delaware for a more hospitable 
state of incorporation” and suggesting that “[p]erhaps it is time to migrate out of Delaware.” 
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1959 & 
n.95 (1991) (quoting these memoranda). 
 226. See Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases Without Controversy, 5 
DEL. L. REV. 115, 121–23 (2002) (describing the appointment process). 
 227. Delaware is lauded for its largely apolitical system of appointments. See id. (noting, in 
particular, that political party affiliations must be equally represented on the courts and that 
members of the  bar, legislative committee members, and the governor all play a significant role 
in the selection process). However, the process is apolitical only in the sense of ensuring equal 
representation of Democrats and Republicans. A candidate whose political vie ws favored 
abolition of the business judgment rule would probably not fare well in the appointments 
process. 
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reverse the substance of judicial decisions in response to the threat of 
corporate migration—Van Gorkom is the starkest example.228 To 
avoid reversal—a legislative incursion into judicial authority—judges 
may craft opinions to limit the risk of corporate migration, thus 
internalizing, albeit for indirect reasons, the constraining effect of this 
threat. Finally, although a few reincorporations out of state do not 
represent a serious threat to the authority of the Delaware judiciary, 
large scale corporate migration poses a direct threat to Delaware 
courts as national corporate lawmakers. The judiciary therefore has a 
direct incentive to avoid opinions that would unleash a flood of 
corporate migration.229 
By contrast, whether it is comprehensive230 or piecemeal,231 
federal preemption reduces the number of issues over which 
Delaware judges effectively speak law and thus poses a direct threat 
to judicial authority.232 The legislature, in a reversal of institutional 
incentives, may be less sensitive to the threat of federal preemption 
                                                 
 228. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the legislative reversal of Van Gorkom). 
 229. This feature may explain the tendency of Delaware courts to announce narrow fact-
specific rulings rather than broadly applicable rules that may prompt many similarly situated 
firms to leave the state. 
 230. Federal preemption would be comprehensive only with a system of federal 
incorporation with jurisdiction in federal courts. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF 
GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); William L. Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum 
Standards Act, 29 BUS. LAW. 1101 (1974); Cary, supra note 204; Richard W. Jennings, 
Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. LAW. 991 (1976); Donald 
E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS. LAW. 1125 (1976). Full-
scale federal incorporation has not been seriously advocated since the late 1970s, although 
piecemeal preemption has been a nearly constant threat. See infra  note 231 and accompanying 
text. 
 231. Piecemeal preemption has taken place through the enactment of federal statutes, such 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, touching on matters of corporate governance. See Pub. Law No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2003) (federalizing several 
substantive aspects of corporate governance regulation that had previously been left to state 
law, including rules requiring independent audit committees, barring accounting firms from 
providing both audit and nonaudit services, barring corporate loans to executive officers, 
requiring executive certification of financial statements, and mandating forfeiture of CEO and 
CFO incentive compensation in the event of an earnings restatement). Piecemeal preemption 
also takes place through SEC rulemaking that supplants state law, such as the “all-holders” rule 
after Unocal, which Professor Roe describes as a “Sharp Federal Incursion” on state corporate 
law. See SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (2003); SEC Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 
(2003) (reversing the narrow holding of Unocal, which allowed selective self-tenders, with a rule 
requiring tender offers to be made to all holders); Roe, supra  note 177, at 616, 619. 
 232. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance , 30 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 79 (2005) (describing the longstanding ambition of the SEC to regulate corporate 
governance). 
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given that, short of a comprehensive regime of federal 
incorporation—not presently a serious prospect—federal law does 
not offer corporations an alternative to organizing in states or to 
paying state franchise fees,233 and as long as Delaware’s franchise fees 
are safe, state legislators are less likely to be concerned. But, because 
the state courts lose some measure of their authority with every 
federal incursion into what would otherwise be the domain of state 
law, an authority-maximizing judiciary will remain highly sensitive to 
the threat of federal preemption. Indeed, these concerns predominate 
in Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine’s recent call for 
greater judicial responsiveness to precisely those issues that are most 
likely to pique federal interest.234 
In order to preserve its place in corporate lawmaking amid these 
threats to its authority, the judiciary must respond, and the only way 
that it can respond is through the rhetoric of the judicial opinion. As a 
speech act designed to accomplish some end,235 the essential function 
of rhetoric in corporate law jurisprudence is thus revealed as the 
protection of judicial authority from the twin threats of corporate 
migration and federal preemption. Rhetorical devices, such as the 
good faith thaumatrope, force open rigid doctrines to permit the 
judiciary greater flexibility in responding to these threats, or 
alternately, countervailing devices, such as the business judgment 
rule, allow courts to promise less intervention. The dynamic interplay 
of these rhetorical devices in different interpretive climates is what 
gives corporate law jurisprudence its basic shape: When federal 
preemption looms large, as in periods of scandal and crisis,236 
corporate law judges manipulate doctrine to increase management 
accountability in hopes of quieting calls for federal intervention. 
When the risk of federal intervention recedes, however, the corporate 
lobby may reassert itself, pressing the le gislature and, indirectly, the 
judiciary to return to a position of board deference. This motion, 
forward and back, along the authority/accountability spectrum as a 
function, not of law, but of the extralegal pressures exerted upon the 
                                                 
 233. Short of a comprehensive regime of federal incorporation, federal corporate law could 
threaten Delaware revenues if it preempted so much of the scope of corporate law that it made 
the state of incorporation essentially irrelevant. The incremental steps toward federalization of 
corporate law, however, seem well short of this point. 
 234. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Karmel, supra note 232, at 80 (noting that the SEC “from time to time, has 
exploited scandals in the public securities markets” to achieve the goal of regulating corporate 
governance). 
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judiciary, is the essence of corporate law jurisprudence. The rhetorical 
devices, whether “good faith” or “intermediate scrutiny” or “business 
judgment,” are the tools that the judiciary employs to accomplish this 
motion. 
The remainder of this Part applies this theoretical model to 
corporate law jurisprudence, first illustrating the pattern of regulation 
and retreat in a brief review of corporate law history, then arguing 
that the same forces of doctrinal expansion and contraction are likely 
to play a central role in the evolution of the jurisprudence of good 
faith. 
B. Expansion and Contraction 
Corporate law doctrines expand and contract as a result of 
pressures on the judiciary. Board accountability increases in periods 
of scandal and crisis, only to decrease again as the crisis recedes. This 
is a recurring pattern in corporate law, documented recently by 
Professor Roe.237 Of the various episodes of expansion and 
contraction,238 the one that may be most illustrative of the likely 
evolution of good faith is the one that began with the “watershed” 
year of 1985.239 
                                                 
 237. See Roe, supra note 177, at 641–43 (illustrating this pattern over a forty-year survey of 
Delaware corporate law and finding that “[s]tate competition’s effect on Delaware seem[ed] 
comparatively subdued in the 1970s and early 1980s” when “the federal threat seem[ed] to 
influence Delaware more,” but then “in the late 1980s, [when] the federal players [left] the 
scene [,]” promanagement decisionmaking reemerged and continued throughout the 1990s, until 
the reemergence of federal pressure in “with the Enron-era scandals”). 
 238. A story similar to the account of takeover jurisprudence argued in this Section can be 
told, for example, about the 1977 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 
380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977), in which the court essentially held that a board must have a 
business purpose for a cash-out merger, only to be reversed, in 1983, by Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983), which held that boards were under no such requirement and 
merely had to meet loose procedural standards in such transactions. The Singer decision arose at 
a time when the federalization of corporate law was actively debated, and the decision arguably 
caused the SEC to curb the more restrictive aspects of its rulemaking on cash-out mergers. 
Compare Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14185 (Nov. 17, 1977) (proposing a rule that 
included a fairness test as well as disclosure requirements in such transactions) with Securities 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 6100, 6109 (adopting a final rule without a fairness test). Professor 
Roe documents a number of such incidents at “recurring breakdowns” in American corporate 
governance. Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, in 
RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 9, 13 (Jay W. Lorsch et al. eds., 2005) (describing 
recurring breakdowns and various legal and institutional responses). 
 239. See E. Norman Veasey, The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger and Acquisition 
Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 849 (2001) (“The year 1985 was a watershed in Delaware 
corporate jurisprudence.”) Chief Justice Veasey continued, in unusually florid prose, to 
emphasize the tensions confronting the Delaware judiciary as they decided these cases:  
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1. The Watershed Year.  The corporate law jurisprudence that 
emerged in Delaware in 1985 was, like the recent post-Enron 
decisions, a product of crisis and controversy. The late 1970s and early 
1980s were a time of general economic malaise, with high inflation, 
high interest rates, and ultimately, recession and unemployment.240 
American companies seemed to be losing ground to Japanese rivals, 
with observers predicting dire consequences for the national 
economy. At the same time, hostile takeover activity exploded.241 
Takeover battles became public events, spilling over from 
boardrooms to the mainstream media, legislatures, and courtrooms.242 
The financiers who engineered these acquisitions were vilified for 
fiddling while Rome fell—getting rich while the deals they made 
resulted in plant closures and layoffs, endangering the national 
economy and leaving ordinary workers without jobs.243 If the public 
was largely opposed to takeovers, corporate managers were even 
more so,244 thus presenting state politicians with a unique opportunity 
to unite the interests of wealthy campaign-contributing corporate 
                                                                                                                
At the height of the takeover era the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme 
Court found themselves trying to navigate through a ferocious tempest of mergers 
and acquisitions. The high velocity winds of the economics of these transactions were 
swirling around time -honored jurisprudential concepts of fiduciary duty of directors. 
Change was in the air! The stability of the anchor chain of the business judgment rule 
was severely strained. 
Id. 
 240. JERRY W. MARKHAM, 3 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 70–73 (2002) 
(describing the economic environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s as a time of rapidly 
increasing inflation and shocks in the world oil market resulting in action by the Federal 
Reserve Board to constrain inflation by increasing interest rates, leading to a recession, with 
unemployment reaching 10.7 percent in 1982). 
 241. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law , 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873–74 (2002) (providing 
statistics on the takeover wave of the early- and mid-1980s and noting that “[a] substantial 
portion of the deals during this period were hostile takeovers or defensive transactions 
undertaken in response to hostile takeovers”). 
 242. Takeover battles generated a new vocabulary, involving “junk bonds,” “raiders,” 
“white knights,” “crown jewels,” “shark repe llants,” “poison pills,” and “scorched earth 
defenses.” See, e.g., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS 3 n.1 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 
1988) (translating the new lexicon). The obvious connotative value of the se labels provides 
fairly clear guidance on the identity, in popular opinion, of the good guys and the bad guys. 
 243. See, e.g., WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987) (film pe rsonifying this 
Manichean view of takeovers in the seductively evil character of Gordon Gekko). 
 244. See, e.g., Who Likes Takeovers? , FORBES, May 18, 1987, at 12–16 (describing a 1987 
Harris public opinion poll showing that 58 pe rcent of respondents viewed takeovers as harmful, 
whereas only 8 percent thought them beneficial). 
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managers with rank-and-file voters.245 On the other side, however, 
were the academics and shareholder-rights advocates whose 
arguments resonated not in the mainstream media,246 but in 
Washington where, through the early 1980s, the federal government 
adopted a protakeover attitude.247 
In the thick of this controversy, the Delaware courts handed 
down a monumental set of fiduciary duty decisions. In a single year, 
the Delaware Supreme Court (1) reset the standard of gross 
negligence in Smith v. Van Gorkom,248 (2) restricted the ability of an 
incumbent board of directors to resist an unwanted takeover offer in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,249 and (3) set limits on when a 
target board could favor one buyer over another in Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.250 All three of these decisions 
changed the law of fiduciary duty by modifying or inventing doctrines 
that empowered the judiciary, shifting the authority/accountability 
balance in favor of greater board accountability to courts. 
This Article has already discussed the shock of the Van Gorkom 
decision.251 In the first of its watershed decisions, the Delaware 
                                                 
 245. The outcome of these unified interests was antitakeover legislation. See Mark J. Roe, 
Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE, 321, 331 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (“[L]egislators 
who do managers’ bidding do not have to fear reprisal from voters. It is the opposite. Politicians 
who bash Wall Street and thwart takeovers are rewarded by the average voter.”); Roberta 
Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
457, 461 (1988) (describing the adoption of antitakeover statutes by state legislatures and 
explaining that “[t]he statutes are typically enacted rapidly, with virtually unanimous support 
and little public notice, let alone discussion. They are frequently pushed through the legislature 
at the behest of a major local corporation that is the target of a hostile bid or apprehensive that 
it will become a target” (footnotes omitted)). 
 246. Academics have argued, then and now, that takeover defenses obstruct the efficient 
transfer of resources, impede the capital market discipline of managers, and hinder the ability of 
shareholders to sell their interest at a premium. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 983–84 (2002) (arguing that 
boards should not be able to block noncoercive bids); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 
1194–97 (1981) (arguing for board passivity in the face of takeovers); Bengt Holstrom & Steven 
Kaplan, Corporate Governance, and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 
1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (2001) (describing the arguments of takeover 
proponents); Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, 
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 242, at 314, 329–37 (describing positive economic effects of 
bust-up takeovers). 
 247. See Roe, supra note 177, at 16 (“At the time, powerful policymakers in Washington 
favored takeovers.”). 
 248. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 249. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 250. 506 A.2d 173, 184–85 (Del. 1985). 
 251. See supra Part I.A. 
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Supreme Court changed the law not by creating a new standard, but 
by applying an old one, gross negligence, in an unprecedented 
manner. Because a looser interpretation of gross negligence means 
more opportunities to hold directors accountable for their actions, the 
majority’s interpretation of gross negligence moved the barrier 
between board authority and judicial accountability—in this case, the 
business judgment rule itself—to permit greater judicial intervention 
in corporate governance. 
Similarly, Unocal promised to increase the scope of judicial 
intervention in takeovers by giving courts a say in which takeover 
defenses were appropriate and which were not.252 Prior to Unocal, 
courts had treated board actions in the takeover context with roughly 
the same deference as board decisionmaking in any other context. As 
long as the target board could claim some benefit to the corporation 
from resistance, takeover defenses were permitted under the 
“business purpose” standard,253 which essentially applied the business 
judgment rule to takeover defense.254 In Unocal, however, the court 
expressly recognized the possibility of an entrenchment motivation 
underlying a takeover defense and therefore refused to grant simple 
deference to the board.255 Instead, the court created a new 
“intermediate standard” between the deferential business judgment 
                                                 
 252. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 253. See Cheff v. Ma thes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964) (“ [I]f the [board’s takeover defense 
was] motivated by a sincere belief that the [takeover defense] was necessary to maintain what 
the board believed to be proper business practices, the board will not be held liable for such 
decision, even though hindsight indicates the decision was not the wisest course .”). Although 
aware of the potential entrenchment motivation for takeover resistance, courts did not allow 
this theoretical possibility to overcome the principle of board authority. See, e.g., Bennet v. 
Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962) (finding a conflict of interest on the part of a board that 
used corporate funds to repurchase in order to protect its own control). The apparent 
willingness of the Bennett court to acknowledge a target board’s conflict of interest in the 
takeover context was qualified in later opinions. See e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 
292 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding the trial court’s jury instruction that the business judgment rule “is 
rebutted only where a director’s sole or primary purpose for adopting a course of action or 
refusing to adopt another is to retain control”). 
 254. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624, 627 (Del. 1984) (holding that the “bedrock” 
principle of the business judgment rule was “equally applicable here in the context of a 
takeover”). 
 255. The court stated: 
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred. 
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
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rule and strict “entire fairness” review,256 thus increasing the 
accountability of boards to courts in the takeover context.257 
Like Unocal, the Revlon decision emerged from a takeover 
battle.258 After a series of maneuvers designed to frustrate Ron 
Perelman’s hostile bid, the Revlon board ultimately negotiated a sale 
of the company to a preferred buyer at a price lower than Perelman’s 
bid.259 This, the Delaware Supreme Court held, went too far.260 In so 
holding, the court created so-called “Revlon duties,”261 a special case 
                                                 
 256. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for 
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 252–60 
(1989) (reviewing the operation and effect of Unocal scrutiny). Like the recent jurisprudence of 
good faith, intermediate scrutiny is constructed on a rhetoric that mixes categories in developing 
a new basis for judicial intervention in board decisionmaking. Intermediate scrutiny occupies 
the middle space between the entire fairness standard and the business judgment rule. 
 257. The new standard ultimately tested the proportionality between the threat to target 
shareholders and the target board’s response, requiring that the response have an “element of 
balance” and be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The 
threat in Unocal itself was Mesa’s two tier-tender offer, which promised shareholders who 
tendered a better mix of consideration (primarily cash) than shareholders who chose not to 
tender (junk bonds), thus pressuring shareholders who wished to avoid the back-end 
consideration to tender regardless of whether they considered the transaction optimal. Unocal’s 
response was a tender for its own shares. In evaluating proportionality, however, the court failed 
to analyze the coerciveness of Unocal’s tender offer, which replicated the essential structure of 
the Mesa offer. Those who did not or could not tender their shares in the offer would continue 
to be shareholders of Unocal, but after the massive front-end payout, their shares would be 
worth far less than the front-end offer of seventy-two dollars. See Michael C. Jensen, When 
Unocal Won over Pickens, Shareholders and Society Lost, FINANCIER, Nov. 1985, at 50, 51 
(finding that the market value of remaining Unocal shares was thirty-five dollars). Worse still, 
the effective back end of the Unocal offer, unlike the Mesa offer, created no appraisal rights for 
recipients because they simply remained Unocal shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 
(2001) (establishing appraisal rights for shareholders who exchange their shares for 
consideration, not for those who remain holders). In this way, the Unocal offer had exactly the 
same structure as the Mesa offer and was, if anything, more coercive, yet the court deemed it to 
be a proportional response to the Mesa threat. This hidden deference, under the surface of 
Unocal itself, did not become clear until later. See infra  notes 263–72 and accompanying text. 
 258. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1985). 
 259. As a “white knight,” Forstmann agreed to buy Revlon and let incumbent management 
run it, provided that management sold off some of the company’s business divisions and 
remained capable of servicing its debt oblig ations. Id. at 178–79. 
 260. Because either transaction would result in the breakup of the corporation, the board 
was required to get the most it could for its shareholders. The court stated: 
[I]t became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable. . . . The 
duty of the board had thus changed from the pre servation of Revlon as a corporate 
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit. . . . The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’ 
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. 
Id. at 182. 
 261. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
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in which the deference of the business judgment rule would not apply. 
Like the invention of intermediate scrutiny, the creation of Revlon 
duties shifted the frontier of the authority/accountability spectrum in 
favor of greater board accountability to courts. 
In each of these cases, Delaware courts responded to crisis by 
creating a means for greater judicial intervention. Van Gorkom’s 
revision of gross negligence, Unocal’s invention of intermediate 
scrutiny, and the creation of Revlon duties each increased the ability 
of the judiciary to intervene in board decisionmaking. All three of the 
decisions, in other words, reacted to the climate of controversy by 
shifting the balance of power from board authority in the direction of 
greater judicial accountability. 
2. The Waters Recede .  This shift in the authority/accountability 
balance, however, did not last. The ultimate impact of each of the 
watershed decisions has been either eliminated or substantially 
reduced. Van Gorkom has been reversed by the legislature, Unocal 
slowly eroded through lax application, Revlon expressly narrowed. 
This retreat from doctrinal innovation is as much a part of corporate 
law as the innovations themselves, with important implications for the 
development of the jurisprudence of good faith. 
As described above, the supreme court’s attempted rewrite of 
the business judgment rule in Van Gorkom did not survive the 
legislature.262 With the adoption of § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, the management lobby won an 
amendment effectively overturning the decision.263 This episode fits 
nicely with the standard political economy account of Delaware 
corporate law: legislators are sensitive to changes in the law that 
might cause corporations to leave and, when they can be persuaded 
that the courts have made such changes, are apt to undo them.264 
Although the retreat from intermediate scrutiny was more 
gradual, there is a sense in which Unocal did not last much longer 
                                                 
 262. See supra Part I.A. 
 263. The threat to leave Delaware may have been especially credible after Van Gorkom 
because another state, Indiana, had acted first in passing a statute to shield its directors from 
liability under the duty of care. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of 
the Insurance Crisis, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, 
AND CONSUMER WELFARE 151, 157 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (pointing out that Indiana’s 
statute was enacted prior to Delaware’s and noting its difference in approach). 
 264. See supra  Part III.A; see also Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover 
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120–22 (1987) (describing the coalition explanation of takeover 
legislation).  
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than Van Gorkom. Within a few months of Unocal itself, the supreme 
court, in Moran v. Household International, applied intermediate 
scrutiny to uphold the adoption of a poison pill, arguably the most 
significant structural defense in a takeover target’s arsenal,265 thus 
signaling a retreat from strong readings of Unocal.266 An even clearer 
sign of Unocal’s surrender, however, came five years later in 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., in which the 
Delaware Supreme Court validated the “just say no” defense, holding 
that a target board does not have to remove defensive devices when 
confronted by a plainly superior offer.267 If Unocal scrutiny permitted 
the “just say no” defense, it was difficult to argue that the standard 
provided a serious check on target board conduct in takeover 
battles.268 Later decisions have further solidified the ability of boards 
to refuse offers that are not coercive but merely “inadequate,”269 
allowing practitioners to conclude that “‘just say no’ is alive and 
well.”270 
                                                 
 265. Poison pills work by making hostile tender offers prohibitively expensive. However, a 
company with a poison pill alone is not takeover proof. See generally  Bebchuk et al., supra note 
110 (describing the combined effects of takeover defenses). 
 266. Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) . 
 267. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). In Time, the court 
stated: 
Plaintiffs’ position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of review 
under Unocal principally because it would involve the court in substituting its 
judgment of what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board as to directors. To 
the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in certain of its opinions, 
we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis.  
Id. at 1153. 
 268. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 551 
(1997) (arguing that ability of boards to resist takeovers ad infinitum “would . . . have a 
devastating impact on the control market and, ultimately, would have large scale economic 
effects”).  
 269. Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1557 (D. Del. 1995) 
(recognizing as a threat the possibility that shareholders, “tempted by the suitor’s premium, 
might tender their shares in ignorance or mistaken belief as to management’s representations of 
intrinsic value and future expectations”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, 
Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) (endorsing the concept of “substantive coercion” and 
recognizing the threat that shareholders would mistakenly sell for an apparent premium when 
“the board considered Unitrin’s stock to be a good long-term investme nt”); Bernard Black & 
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search For Hidden Value, 96 NW. 
U. L. REV. 521, 523 (2002) (stating that “‘substantive coe rcion,’ [is] a term which one of us now 
regrets having introduced . . . to describe how a court might (by squinting) conclude that 
shareholders who wished to accept a tender offer were coerced into doing so, merely because 
the target’s board considered the offer price to be too low”).  
 270. See Adam O. Emmerich et al., “Just Say No” is Alive and Well, Wachtell Lipton Rosen 
& Katz client memorandum, Dec. 4, 2003 (describing ArvinMentor’s attempted takeover of the 
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Unocal, by contrast, is not doing so well. The doctrinal evolution 
since 1985 clearly shows a steady decline in the stringency of 
intermediate scrutiny. No case has yet overruled Unocal, but given 
the fact-specific nature of Delaware law, none has had to.271 Instead, 
courts have steadily eroded the application and force of intermediate 
scrutiny.272 Professors Thompson and Smith empirically confirmed the 
steady erosion of the Unocal standard in a study that gathered all 
Delaware decisions citing Unocal between 1985 and the end of 
2000.273 The study found that the vast majority of chancery court 
decisions and all supreme court decisions outside of the change-of-
control context approved boards’ defensive devices in spite of 
claiming to apply intermediate scrutiny.274 In sum, little of substance 
                                                                                                                
Dana Corporation and Dana’s use of the just say no defense to remain independent) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 271. See Fisch, supra  note 221: 
[T]he [Delaware] supreme court . . . appears ready to distinguish or overrule a 
precedent without regard to considerations of stare decisis. The absence of attention 
to stare decisis is partially a consequence of the fact-intensive nature of the court’s 
decisions; the court can easily deny that it is overruling a precedent by using case 
specific facts to distinguish its prior holding. Similarly the court can narrow the 
precedential effect of its decisions by framing its holdings narrowly and tying those 
holdings to specific facts. 
Id. at 1078 (footnote omitted). 
 272. Delaware Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Unocal to situations in which a 
board acts unilaterally and adopts a defense that is outside of a “range of reasonable responses.” 
See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367, 1388 (stating that the “ratio decidendi for the ‘range of 
reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of directors for latitude in discharging its 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against perceived 
threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint” (citation omitted)); Williams v. 
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (applying the business judgment rule to a shareholder-
approved charter amendment and stating that “Unocal analysis should be used only when a 
board unilaterally (i.e., without stockholder approval) adopts defensive measures in reaction to 
a perceived threat”). 
 273. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder 
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2002). 
 274. Id. at 284–86. Throwing out incidental citations, the authors found thirty-four chancery 
court decisions and eight supreme court decisions applying intermediate scrutiny. They found 
nine chancery court decisions that concluded that the target’s defenses were disproportionate. 
Id. Among these were AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 
(Del. Ch. 1986) (finding a two-tier self-tender to be a disproportionate response to a 
“concededly fair” and “non-coercive” takeover bid), City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’Ship v. Interco, 
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[T]he . . . $74 cash offer did not represent a threat to 
shareholder interests sufficient in the circumstances to justify, in effect, foreclosing shareholders 
from electing to accept that offer.”), Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 
1057 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that “a Pillsbury shareholder [might prefer the takeover offer, but] 
a stockholder in Pillsbury cannot make that choice unless the Rights are redeemed”), Robert M. 
Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1238–39 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[R]estructuring represents 
an unreasonable and disproportionate antitakeover response to the Bass Group proposals, and 
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remains of Unocal, and judicial scrutiny of takeover defenses has slid 
most of the way back to the business judgment rule.275 
Subsequent decisions also weakened Revlon duties. Soon after it 
was decided, Revlon could be read to require an auction any time a 
target company was acquired, whether for stock or cash, whether as 
part of a long-standing business strategy or a sudden tender offer. 
This broad reading was later rejected by cases holding that any 
process, not necessarily an auction, could satisfactorily maximize 
shareholder consideration.276 This reading was also rejected by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Time, which narrowed Revlon duties to 
non-“strategic” (primarily cash) deals.277 Time later became the 
                                                                                                                
thus constitutes a violation of the defendants’ fiduciary duties under Unocal entitling plaintiffs 
to an injunction.”), Tate & Lyle Pub. Ltd. Corp. v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 9813, 1988 WL 
46064, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (“[P]laintiffs have shown a reasonable probability that the 
Funding Trust, as presently enacted, is invalid and that they will suffer irreparable harm if the 
Funding Trust becomes immediately funded upon any change in control of Staley.”), and 
Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
27, 1987) (“If, as currently appears, it is determined that the board engaged in conduct wrongful 
to plaintiffs in order to get [the merger] proposal to a shareholder vote, any approval thus 
obtained will necessarily be invalidated.”). It is worth noting, however, that several of these 
decisions were later criticized by the supreme court in Time. See supra note 267. 
 275. See generally  Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life And Adventures Of Unocal—Part I: Moore 
The Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 143 (1998) (stating that “Unocal was created, debated, and 
turned into the equivalent of the business judgment rule”); Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen 
Years Later (and What We Can Do about It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 492, 512 (2001) (“Unocal was 
to provide the theory that Household International lacked, but the lesson of Unocal’s first fifteen 
years is that the Dela ware Supreme Court’s march toward an unarticulated and unjustified 
preference for elections over markets, however understandable in its original motivation, has 
proven to be a failure.”); Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 969 
(“Moran’s Unocal promise—of fiduciary accountability for the board’s use of a pill in the face of 
an actual offer—has vanished.”); Roe, supra note 177, at 625 (noting that Delaware “consciously 
sought to be ‘proportional’ for most of the 1980s” but that “at the end of the decade, with the 
1989 Time-Warner decision, . . . Delaware turn[ed] anti-takeover”).  
 276. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (“Revlon does not 
demand that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated 
bidding contest.”). See generally Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 
(Del. Ch. 1989) (holding that Revlon duties do not require the best price but rather the best 
transaction).  
 277. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del. 1989). Because 
Time had not “abandon[ed] its long -term strategy [to] seek[] an alternative transaction [also] 
involving the breakup of the company,” the supreme court held that the Time board was not 
required to maximize short term consideration and pursue a transaction with Paramount rather 
than Warner, its preferred merger partner. Id. at 1150. The court specified two circumstances in 
which Revlon duties were implicated: 
The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active bidding process 
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up 
of the company. However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to 
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction [also] involving the breakup of the company. 
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exception that swallowed the rule because the vast majority of 
acquisition transactions in the 1990s were structured as the kind of 
“strategic” transactions that did not implicate Revlon duties.278 
So what happened? What explains the judiciary’s retreat from its 
own doctrinal innovations? Federal preemption was a significant 
threat to the Delaware judiciary in the early - and mid-1980s, when 
protakeover forces were strongest in Washington. These decisions can 
be read in part as a prospective response to this threat. The watershed 
decisions responded to the pressures on the judiciary by shifting the 
authority/accountability balance, empowering judges at the expense 
of directors and promising some limitation on the ability of target 
boards to resist takeover.279 At the same time, however, there was 
also a significant promanagement lobby. Hence, intermediate 
scrutiny.280 Later, because the preemption threat did not last,281 but 
rather faded as the takeover discourse settled to the background of 
academic (as opposed to public) debate,282 corporate and business 
lobbies were able to increase the pressure on Delaware to moderate 
its takeover jurisprudence. The legislature passed antitakeover 
legislation and reversed Van Gorkom. The courts began to 
understand that the real threat to their authority was now from the 
promanagement interests represented in the legislature, which 
                                                                                                                
Id. (citation omitted). Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. qualified this rule 
slightly by holding that Revlon duties could be triggered by a stock-for-stock deal that caused a 
target corporation to go from being diffusely held to having a controlling shareholder who 
would dominate the corporation going forward. 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993). 
 278. See Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 753, 761–62 (2000) (stating that friendly transactions far outnumbered hostile ones in the 
1990s). 
 279. It is worth noting that the promise of greater judicial scrutiny of takeover defenses did 
not successfully avert all federal incursions into the state-law territory. Consider, on this point, 
the SEC’s all-holders rule adopted soon after Unocal, which effectively banned the exclusionary 
self-tender used by Unocal and blessed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See supra note 257. 
 280. Unocal scrutiny was thus intermediate not only in splitting the difference between the 
business judgment rule and entire fairness and in combining aspects of loyalty and care, but also 
in mediating the influence of public outcry (that the law do something  about takeover and 
takeover defense) and the political concerns of Delaware and its interest groups (that Delaware 
not do too much to restrain management). 
 281. See Andrew G.T. Moore III & Bayless Manning, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 782 (1987) (noting that federal interest in takeovers had waned).  
 282. At the same time, new “adaptive responses” were invented to alleviate some of the 
strain on the market for corporate control caused by antitakeover provisions, including 
increasing reliance on outside directors and compensation arrangements structured to 
encourage insiders to look more favorably upon takeover proposals. Adaptive responses 
arguably reduce the harm of judicial deference to takeover defenses. See Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 241, at 873, 890–93. 
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threatened to wrest control of corporate law.283 As a result, courts 
began to apply Unocal less aggressively and to narrow Revlon. 
This, then, is the rhetorical structure of corporate law. Loose 
doctrinal constraints permit constant jurisprudential motion, forward 
and back on the authority/accountability spectrum, in response to 
pressures on the judiciary. Doctrinal flexibility permits judges to 
respond to shifts in interpretive context by increasing or decreasing 
their scrutiny of board conduct. This responsiveness is facilitated by 
the use of rhetorical devices, such as intermediate scrutiny, that can 
support scrutiny in one case and deference in the next.284 
C. Uncharted Waters: Disney and Beyond 
The good faith thaumatrope is a rhetorical device that can 
support scrutiny in one situation, deference in the next. Having 
emerged in an environment of scandal and crisis, it retains a loose 
doctrinal structure—some elements of care along with some elements 
of loyalty—to provide the judiciary with maximum flexibility in its 
corporate law jurisprudence. Delaware’s history of expansion and 
contraction in corporate law, however, teaches that the flexibility of 
good faith at the level of doctrine should not be taken to imply that 
judges will have great flexibility, given the constraints of migration 
and preemption, in applying it. The Delaware judiciary has never 
been free to write corporate law according to its whims. If it shifts the 
balance too far in favor of board accountability, it will stir the threat 
of corporate migration. If it shifts the balance too far in favor of 
board deference, it risks increased federalization of corporate law. 
The flexibility of rhetorical devices, including the good faith 
thaumatrope, is thus constrained to a range dictated by the prevailing 
                                                 
 283. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, The Race to Protect Managers From 
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (1999) (describing states’ incentives to produce 
takeover law favoring management). 
 284. Unocal is more flexible than Revlon. Although there is some interpretive flexibility in 
deciding whether the board’s processes in fact comply with its Revlon duties, the crucial 
question is whether Revlon applies. The rest is an if-then statement: if Revlon applies, then the 
board must maximize consideration at sale. Unocal, by contrast, is a flexible, standards-based 
adjudication, from the initial determination of reasonable threat assessment to the second step 
of evaluating the proportionality of the board’s response to the threat. The greater flexibility of 
Unocal may explain why it has survived and remains broadly applicable to any arguably 
“defensive” action, whereas the Revlon rule has been limited to a unique transaction form. That 
Unocal has, at least until recently, been frequently recited, occasionally applied, but rarely 
violated is an indication of the rhetorical climate in which it evolved. In another climate, in 
which federal intervention in takeover law remained a real threat, it might have been used more 
aggressively. 
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interpretive context and the strength and source of the threat to the 
court’s jurisdiction. 
What does this mean for the likely evolution of the jurisprudence 
of good faith? My theory of corporate law rhetoric can now support a 
prediction. Because it is rhetorically useful, good faith is likely to 
retain the loose character of a thaumatrope, empowering the judiciary 
to apply it (or not) depending upon the interpretive context. More 
specifically, the good faith thaumatrope is most likely to be used 
when public outcry and the possibility of federal intervention put 
pressure on the authority/accountability discourse. When, by contrast, 
the scandal calms and the economy recovers—a process that, by some 
indications at least, began in 2003—there is likely to be less threat of 
federal intervention and, therefore, less need for aggressive judicial 
oversight of boards of directors.285 Under such circumstances, 
corporate law jurisprudence is likely to return to a more deferential 
position. Indeed, the retrenchment of deference began as early as 
2004, when several of the post-scandal decisions that had increased 
the accountability of boards to courts were qualified or narrowed in 
subsequent opinions.286 The jurisprudence of good faith seems likely 
to follow the same path, perhaps coming to resemble intermediate 
scrutiny under Unocal: often recited, occasionally applied, and rarely 
violated. 
This evolutionary trajectory of good faith is confirmed in the 
chancery court’s subsequent decision in the Disney litigation. Having 
sustained the plaintiffs’ claim in his 2003 opinion,287 Chancellor 
Chandler presided over the Disney trial in the fall and winter of 2004, 
                                                 
 285. On the heels of positive stock market returns in 2003 and 2004, a backlash against 
aggressive SEC rulemaking and enforcement seems to have caused the agency to signal a partial 
retreat. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, SEC’s Chairman Is Stepping Down From Split Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2005, at A1 (noting that “some business groups and administration officials . . . 
contended that [outgoing SEC Chairman William Donaldson’s] enforcement and policy 
decisions had been too heavy-handed”); Deborah Solomon, SEC to Host Talks on Contentious 
Rule, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2005, at A3 (citing recent examples to suggest that “the SEC is 
adopting a more moderate tone as it tries to balance corporate concerns with its mission to 
protect investors”). 
 286. The postscandal decisions are discussed at supra note 220. For cases na rrowing  or 
qualifying them, see, e.g., Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (narrowing Oracle 
and suggesting, more broadly, that social ties are not enough to establish a conflict sufficient to 
draw independence into doubt); Orman v. Cullman, No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *21 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (distinguishing Omnicare to uphold deal protections in an acquisition, 
like the NCS-Genesis transaction, involving a controlling -shareholder voting agreement). 
 287. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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ultimately issuing yet another opinion on August 9, 2005.288 This latter 
opinion give the chancellor a second opportunity to define and 
analyze a fiduciary duty claim under the rubric of good faith. 
Directors act in bad faith, Chancellor Chandler wrote in the 2005 
opinion, when they act “for some purpose other than a genuine 
attempt to advance corporate welfare.”289 After suggesting several 
examples in which directors may place their own “interests, 
preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation,”290 the 
chancellor fell back on the intentional-disregard language he had used 
in the 2003 decision, stating that “the concept of intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is 
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining 
whether fiduciaries have acted in good faith.”291 Again, however, the 
court’s analysis of intent ultimately focused on process, including, as 
in Van Gorkom, the length of the board’s meetings,292 inquiries 
typically conducted under analyses of the duty of care.293 To these 
discussions of process, the chancellor merely appended a conclusory 
assertion that the director in question had acted in pursuit of the best 
interests of the company.294 
The motivation of this analysis of process, however, was the 
court’s suspicion of disloyalty. As Chancellor Chandler emphasized in 
                                                 
 288. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).  
 289. Id. at *170 (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051, n.2 (Del. Ch. 
1996)). 
 290. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). The examples 
range from the ordinary (greed and envy) to the fanciful (lust and revenge). 
 291. Id. at *175 (emphasis omitted).  
 292. Id. at *208–20 (evaluating the conduct of directors Sidney Poitier and Ignacio Lozano). 
The court is aware of the parallel, noting that the “arguments unde rstandably hearken back to 
Van Gorkom, where the Supreme Court condemned the Trans Union board for agreeing to a 
material transaction after a board meeting of about two hours . . . .” Id. at *210–11. See Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the discussion at supra note 76 and accompanying 
text. In order to avoid parsing the minutes spent on various types of decisions, the chancellor 
ultimately concluded that because the discussion of the Ovitz matter went on for a “not 
insignificant length of time,” the board had not acted with deliberate indifference. Disney, 2005 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *216. 
 293. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (discussing this suggestion with Elkins). 
 294. See id. at *199 (analyzing Eisner’s conduct and concluding that no evidence showed 
Eisner had been motivated by anything other than “the best interests of the Company”); id. at 
*205 (analyzing Russell’s conduct and concluding that Russell “was doing the best he thought he 
could to advance the interests of the Company”); id. at *207 (analyzing Watson’s conduct and 
concluding that “[n]othing in his conduct leads me to believe that Watson had anything in mind 
other than the best interests of the Company . . . .”). 
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the 2005 opinion, judges will be especially skeptical of “an imperial 
CEO or controlling shareholder with a supine or passive board” who 
seeks to commandeer the board to satisfy a personal rather than a 
corporate interest.295 The ultimate question in Disney, most simply, 
was whether Ovitz’s hiring and severance arrangement resulted from 
the board kowtowing to a desire on the part of Eisner to spread the 
company’s wealth among his personal network of friends. Although 
willing to characterize Eisner as an imperial CEO and criticize the 
board as not truly independent,296 by 2005 the chancellor no longer 
seemed to believe that the Eisner-Ovitz friendship explained Ovitz’s 
hiring and firing.297 Such considerations, of course, illustrate the 
loyalty side of the thaumatrope. Taken together with the process 
analysis, the 2005 Disney decision provides another example of 
thaumatrope analytics. 
In granting judgment for the defendants on all claims,298 the 2005 
Disney decision also illustrates that the balance between board 
authority and judicial accountability has has returned to a highly 
deferential position. No longer seeking to forge new ground in 
corporate law jurisprudence, the 2005 opinion refers to the 
shareholders’ complaint as “a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary 
duty claim” rather than a claim of bad faith.299 Moreover, Chancellor 
Chandler emphasized the distinction between the aspirations of 
corporate governance and the requirements of corporate law from the 
very outset of the opinion, 300 recalling the themes that former Chief 
Justice Veasey had sounded in Brehm and his pre-scandal speeches.301 
                                                 
 295. See id. at *192, n.487. 
 296. Id. at *192–93. 
 297. Derivations of the word “friend” appear half as often in the 2005 opinion as in the 2003 
opinion, and as the trial revealed, the word did not seem to mean as much as one might have 
supposed. In his testimony, Eisner emphasized that his relationship with Ovitz was more 
accurately characterized as a business relationship. “Michael Ovitz,” Eisner testified, “had a lot 
of best friends.” See Laura M. Holson, Eisner, on the Stand, Describes Courting of Ovitz, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at C1. 
 298. Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *3. 
 299. Id. at *174. 
 300. Id. at *4 (“Delaware law does not . . . hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with 
the aspirational ideal of best practices . . . .”). 
 301. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256–57 (Del. 2000) (“Aspirational ideals of good 
corporate governance practices . . . are highly desirable . . . . But they are not required by the 
corporation law.”); Veasey, supra note 191 (discussing the interplay between corporate law and 
aspirational ideals). 
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Compare Veasey’s 2001 speech at Penn, previously discussed,302 with 
Chandler’s insistence, in the 2005 opinion, that: 
other institutions may develop, pronounce and urge adherence to 
ideals of corporate best practices. But the development of 
aspirational ideals, however worthy as goals for human behavior, 
should not work to distort the legal requirements by which human 
behavior is actually measured. Nor should the common law of 
fiduciary duties become a prisoner of narrow definitions or 
formulaic expressions.303 
The pendulum, it seems, has swung back in favor of board authority 
and away from judicial intervention. 
It is the Delaware Supreme Court that will ultimately decide the 
doctrinal status of good faith, possibly in its consideration of the 
plaintiffs’ appeal.304 As this Article has argued, the outcome will 
depend largely on pressures within the corporate law discourse. If 
economic recovery continues, however, and further scandals do not 
suddenly arise, the supreme court seems likely to affirm the 2005 
decision and to explain the chancery court’s good faith jurisprudence 
as a welcome rehabilitation of the duty of loyalty. The chancery 
court’s basic emphasis—that directors can be disloyal for a variety of 
reasons other than simple financial self-interest—essentially extends 
the meaning and reach of the duty of loyalty beyond the narrow 
categories into which it had previously been confined.305 This 
interpretation would simultaneously retain good faith as an open-
textured rhetorical device while also creating a means by which 
boards could respond—through, for example, disclosure and approval 
or ratification306—to avoid its application. 
                                                 
 302. See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
 303. Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *5. 
 304. The chancellor’s decision was immediately appealed. See Bruce Orwall & Merissa 
Marr, Judge Backs Disney Directors In Suit on Ovitz’s Hiring, Firing , WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 
2005, at A1 (“Attorneys for shareholders who sued the board said they would appeal the 
ruling.”). 
 305. Chancellor Chandler suggested this himself, quoting an earlier version of this Article to 
argue that the real problem is the excessive rigidity of existing doctrinal classifications. See 
Disney, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *149 n.402. 
 306. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2003) (providing that conflict-of-interest 
transactions are not voidable if they are approved, ratified, or fair). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has drawn upon corporate law theory and corporate 
law history to analyze the Delaware judiciary’s rediscovery of the 
principle of good faith. Tracing the principle through a line of cases, 
this Article has described good faith as a thaumatrope. In their 
discussions of good faith, courts oscillate between loyalty issues and 
care issues, finding good faith to be in doubt if issues are raised under 
each traditional fiduciary duty, regardless of whether all of the 
doctrinal requirements of either standard have been fulfilled.  
It is no accident that good faith reemerged during a period of 
scandal and crisis in American corporate governance. After Enron, 
WorldCom, and the like, the Delaware judiciary faced a heightened 
threat of federal preemption, and it responded by loosening its 
doctrinal constraints to intervene more actively in corporate 
governance. Corporate law history provides several examples of such 
shifts toward greater judicial accountability in periods of scandal and 
as many examples of shifts back once the scandal recedes and the 
threat of corporate migration reappears. Each of these shifts is 
accomplished through the invention and deployment of rhetorical 
devices. The good faith thaumatrope is one such device, not unlike 
intermediate scrutiny or a host of other devices in this repeated 
pattern of regulation and retreat. As such, it is likely to follow the 
same evolutionary path, being applied less aggressively as the 
calamity calms. 
This Article’s prediction that the shift in the 
authority/accountability balance brought by good faith will not be 
permanent should not be construed as a suggestion that good faith is 
unimportant. Good faith is a paradigmatic illustration of the workings 
of corporate law jurisprudence, demonstrating both the basic 
flexibility of corporate law doctrine and the vital importance of the 
political undercurrents both motivating and constraining the judiciary 
in its application of doctrine. No understanding of corporate law is 
complete without an account of these forces, which is what this 
Article, at its core, has sought to provide, elaborating the rhetorical 
structure of corporate law through a close analysis of the emerging 
jurisprudence of good faith. 
